HomeMy WebLinkAboutZOA-99-067. PUBLIC HEARING
A. Case No. WZ-99-12: Application by Roger Loecher for approval of a zone change from
Residential-Two to Restricted Commercial-One for the purpose of building a 4,200
square foot credit union and office building on property located at 3502 Wadsworth
Boulevard.
Because the drainage report has not yet been approved, staff requested continuance of this
case.
It was moved by Commissioner SNOW and seconded by Commissioner GOKEY
that Case No. WZ-99-12 be continued to December 2, 1999 to allow the drainage
report to be completed. The motion passed by a vote of 6-0 with Commissioner
COLLINS absent.
B. Case No. ZOA 99-06: Application by the City of Wheat Ridge amending Section 26 (c)
of Appendix A of the Wheat Ridge Code of Laws/Zoning Ordinance establishing the
point in the development process when the right to develop is vested as mandated by new
state legislation.
Alan White stated that staff is withdrawing this case based upon City Council's decision
that, since the City of Wheat Ridge is a home rule municipality, vesting property rights is
a matter of local interest and cannot be mandated by the State. City Council has chosen
not to change existing legislation at this time.
8. CLOSE THE PUBLIC HEARING
Chair BRINKMAN declared the public hearing portion of the meeting to be closed.
9. ELECTION OF OFFICERS
The Commission placed ballots for selection of Chair and Vice Chair according to By-
Laws with the following results:
Don MacDougall was elected as Planning Commission Chair.
Anne Brinkman was elected as Planning Commission Vice Chair.
At this point in the meeting, Commissioner BRINKMAN handed the gavel to Chair
MACDOUGALL.
10. OLD BUSINESS
C. Northwest Fruitdale Circulation Plan: Chair MACDOUGALL opened discussion
between the Commission, the public and staff regarding the need for, and the possible
design of a circulation master plan for the area generally bounded by West 44th Avenue
Planning Commission Page 2
November 18, 1999
NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING
Notice is hereby given that a Public Hearing is to be held before the City of Wheat Ridge
PLANNING COMMISSION on November 18, at 7:30 p.m. at 7500 West 29th Avenue, Wheat
Ridge, Colorado. All interested citizens are invited to speak at the Public Hearing or submit
written comments. The following petitions shall be heard:
Case No. WZ-99-12: Application by Roger Loecher for approval of a zone change from
Residential-Two to Restricted Commercial-One for the purpose of building a 4,200
square foot credit union and office building on property located at 3502 Wadsworth
Boulevard and legally described as follows:
All that portion of the Northeast one-quarter of Section 26, Township 3 South, Range 69
West of the 6`h P.M., described as follows:
Beginning at a point on the west line of the Northeast one-quarter of said Section 26,
Township 3 South, Range 69 West of the 6`h P.M., 1350 Feet North of the Southwest
corner of said Northeast one-quarter, thence North along said West line 190 feet, thence
East 175 feet, thence South along the West line of property described in Book 1494, at
Page 134 a distance of 190 feet, to the North line of West 35 h Avenue, thence West 175
feet along the North line of said West 35`h Avenue and the Westerly extension thereof to
the point of beginning, excepting therefrom, those portions thereof described in Book
1185, at Page 428 and in Book 1185, at Page 430, all in the County of Jefferson, City of
Wheat Ridge, State of Colorado.
2. Case No. ZOA-99-06: An application by the City of Wheat Ridge amending Section
26(c) of Appendix A of the Wheat Ridge Code of Laws/Zoning Ordinance establishing
the point in the development process when the right to develop is vested as mandated by
new state legislation.
Barbara Delgadillo, Senior Secretary
ATTEST:
Wanda Sang, City Clerk
To be Published: October 29, 1999
Wheat Ridge Transcript
C: Ba,ba,a\PCRPTS\PLANGCONPPUBFR2G\991118pubmpd
11/12/99 FRI 12:11 FAX 303 376 5001 GORSUCR BIRGIS Q002
0
GORSUCH KIRGIS LLB'
ATTOANEys AT LAW
MEMORANDUM
TO: Planning Commission
Mayor and Council
FROM: Gerald E. Dahl
DATE: November 12, 1999
RE: Amendment to City's Vested Rights Code Section
During its 1999 session, the General Assembly amended legislation originally
enacted in 1987 at the request of the development industry. The 1987 act
provided that rights to develop property would "vest" upon approval of a "site
specific development plan" by a local government. The act provided that the local
government itself . could set a different point in the approval process as the
"vesting" point. The 1999 act requires local governments to act prior to
January 1, 2000, to do this, and makes other changes to the statute.
Wheat Ridge responded to the 1987 enactment by adoption of Wheat Ridge
Code of Laws Section 26-6(G), which specifies, as the vesting point, the issuance
of a building permit and reasonable reliance thereon. Accordingly, Wheat Ridge has
already complied with the requirement that it locally identify a vesting point.
However, because the passage of time has suggested some additional corrections
which can be made, I have drafted the attached ordinance to further "tune up" the
Wheat Ridge vested property rights code section. In addition, to the extent the
1999 legislation requires action by the City, the attached ordinance satisfies that
requirement.
GEDtmmw
Enclosures
GED\530271332188.01
y-1
11%12/99 FRI 12:11 FAX 303 376 5001 GORSUCR KIRGIS
CITY OF WHEAT RIDGE, COLORADO
INTRODUCED BY COUNCIL MEMBER
Council Bill No.
Ordinance No.
Series of 1999
TITLE: AN ORDINANCE CONCERNING VESTED PROPERTY RIGHTS
WHEREAS, as a consequence of the recent adoption of House Bill 1280 by the
Colorado Legislature, the City desires to revise provisions of the Wheat Ridge Code of
Laws regarding vested property rights; and
WHEREAS, it is in the City's interest to provide a procedure governing the timing of
the creation and vested property rights under the City's zoning code and pursuant to state
statute, and providing that approval of agreements for vesting in excess of three years is a
legislative act, and therefore;
BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF WHEAT RIDGE,
COLORADO:
Section 1. Article 1, Chapter 26 of the Wheat Ridge Code of Laws is hereby
amended by the repeal and reenactment of Section 26-6(G), to read as follows:
(G) Vested Prooertv Riahts.
(1) For all developments, the final approval step, irrespective of its
title, which occurs prior to building permit shall be considered the "site
specific development plan" for purposes of Article 68 of Title 24, C.R.S, A
license, map, variance, easement, or permit (other than a conditional or
special use permit) shall not constitute a site specific development plan. For
those developments for which only a building, fill or grading permit is
required, a vested property right shall be created if, after a building, grading
or fill permit has been lawfully issued, the successful applicant, owner or
permit holder (expressly provided that approval has been granted and/or a
permit has been issued in compliance with all applicable laws, rules and
regulations, and not based upon a "misrepresentation of fact or a mutual
mistake of fact") has taken lawful, reasonable and substantial steps, and has
incurred lawful, reasonable and substantial expenses, in justifiable reliance
upon the permit.
(2) In the event an applicant for a site development plan approval
(other than building, grading, or fill permit approval) wishes said approval to
have the effect of creating vested property rights pursuant to Article 68 of
Title 24, C.R.S., the applicant must so request, in writing, at least thirty (30)
days prior to the date said approval is to be considered. Failure to so request
renders the approval not a "site specific development plan," and no vested
rights shall be deemed to have been created thereby.
KLa530271326442.01
la 003
6-V
11/12/99 FRI 12:12 FAX 303 376 5001 GORSUCR KIRGIS IR004
(3) In the event amendments to a site specific development plan
are proposed and approved, the effective date of such amendments, for
purposes of duration of a vested property right, shall be the date of the
approval of the original site specific development plan, unless the body
granting final approval of such amendments specifically finds to the contrary
and incorporates such finding in its approval of the amendment.
(4) The City may revoke a vested property right for failure to abide
by the terms and conditions of such vested property right. Such revocation
proceeding shall be conducted by the body which granted the prior approval.
Prior to taking action to revoke a vested property right, the City shall provide
a hearing to the affected landowner with at least 14 days prior written
notice mailed to the property address of record in the County Assessor's
office as well as provide notice in the same manner as the posting or
publishing of ordinances and resolutions. The mailed notice shall specifically
identify the terms and conditions which are not in compliance with the site
specific development plan approval. During the period of determining
compliance with the terms and conditions of a site specific development plan
approval, the City may administratively withhold any building, utility,
excavation, road cut or other City permit, and may withhold acceptance of
additional development applications or processing of existing development
applications for the property subject to the site specific development plan.
(5) A pending site specific development plan application will be
governed by the duly adopted laws and regulations in effect at the time the
application is submitted, with the exception that the City reserves the right
pursuant to C.R.S. § 24-6-102,5(2) to enforce new or amended laws or
regulations to pending applications when such law or regulation is necessary
for the immediate preservation of public health and safety, including
temporary development restrictions or moratoria duly adopted by ordinance
for the purposes of preparing planning studies and considering land use
regulations related to public health and safety or for the purpose of
promoting concurrency of essential public infrastructure, equipment or
services with increased demand,
(6) Nothing in this Section is intended to create any vested
property right, but only to implement the provisions of Article 68 of Title 24,
C.R.S. Pursuant to the provisions of Article XX, Section 6, of the Colorado
Constitution, the electors of the City of Wheat Ridge, Colorado, have
adopted a home-rule charter. The law is and remains clear and certain that
the adoption of a home-rule charter vests the citizens of a home-rule city,
and the legislative body thereof, with the power and authority to enact
legislation on matters of purely local concern, which legislation preempts and
supersedes state legislation as to those matters of purely local concern.
Zoning is and has, on numerous occasions, been declared and confirmed by
the Colorado Supreme Court as a matter of purely local concern. In the
event of a judicial determination that the provisions of C.R.S. § 24-68-101,
et seq. are ruled unconstitutional and invalid generally or with respect to
home rule municipalities, this Section shall be deemed to be repealed and no
KLMS3027\326442.01 - -2-
15-3
11/12/99 FRI 12:12 FAX 303 3T6 5001 GORSUCH KIRGIS
longer effective, the City of Wheat Ridge shall revert to the common law of
estoppel in pais as that doctrine existed on June 30, 1987, as the law of
vested property rights within the City of Wheat Ridge.
Section 2. Safety Clause. The City Council hereby finds, determines, and declares
that this Ordinance is promulgated under the general police power of the City of Wheat
Ridge, that it is promulgated for the health, safety, and welfare of the public and that this
Ordinance is necessary for the preservation of health and safety and for the protection of
public convenience and welfare, The City Council further determines that the Ordinance
bears a rational relation to the proper legislative object sought to be attained.
Section 3. Severability• Conflicting Ordinances Revealed. If any section,
subsection or clause of this ordinance shall be deemed to be unconstitutional or otherwise
invalid, the validity of the remaining sections, subsections and clauses shall not be affected
thereby. All other ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict with the provisions of this
ordinance are hereby repealed.
Section 4. Effective Date. This Ordinance shall take effect fifteen days after final
publication, as provided by Section 5.11 of the Charter.
INTRODUCED, READ, AND ADOPTED on first reading by a vote of to
on this day of , 1999, ordered published in full in a
newspaper of general circulation in the City of Wheat Ridge and Public Hearing and
consideration on final passage set for , 1999, at 7:00 o'clock p.m., in
the Council Chambers, 7500 West 29th Avenue, Wheat Ridge, Colorado.
READ, ADOPTED AND ORDERED PUBLISHED on second and final reading by a vote
of to , this day of , 1999.
SIGNED by the Mayor on this day of
ATTEST:
WANDA SANG, CITY CLERK
1999.
GRETCHEN CERVENY, MAYOR
Approved As To Form By City Attorney
Gerald E. Dahl
First Publication:
Second Publication:
Wheat Ridge Transcript
Effective Date:
KLE15302T326"2.01
-3-
005
-Bf
In
Subject: Fwd: Announcement for Free Land Use Planning Workshop
To: members@apacolorado.org
ov
Andy Hill <andy.hill@state.co.us> wrote:
a
> Date: Mon, 02 Aug 1999 16:43:32 -0600
> From: "Andy Hill" <andy.hill@state.co.us>
> To: <webmaster@apacolorado.org>
> Subject: Announcement for Free Land Use Planning Workshop
> The Colorado Department of Local Affairs, Colorado. Counties, Inc. and
Colorado
> Municipal League are sponsoring a series of legislative and growth
management workshops
> this month.
> The 1999 session of the General Assembly saw the passage of several
bills of interest
> to local government officials. Notably, HB 99-1280 ("Vested Rights") and
SB 99-218
> ("Takings") will have important implications for local government practices
regarding
> land use planning.
> Experienced municipal and county attorneys will offer practical advice on
how local
> governments can operate, given this new legislation. Material on how to
interpret the
> statutes, model ordinances to help with compliance, and the opportunity
for local
> officials to share their experiences will be provided. The workshops also
will provide
> an overview of several current attempts to grapple with the growth
management issue,
> and views of local officials will be sought to help inform the debate on
Printed for Meredith Reckert <meredith@ci.wheatridge.co.us> 1
In
g rowth.
> Invite your planning commission members, elected officials, attorneys
and/or
> administrators/managers. Call DOLA at 303-866-2771 for an agenda and
to register (or
>e-mail andy.hill@state.co.us). Workshop provided for free. Dates and
locations listed
> below:
> (All workshops begin at 9 a.m. and end at 12:30 p.m.)
> Wed, Aug 18, Grand Junction
> Thurs, Aug 19, Durango
> Fri, Aug 20, Salida
> Wed, Aug 25, Akron
> Thurs, Aug 26, Denver
> Fri, Aug 27, Pueblo
> Hope you can make it!
> Andy Hill
> Colorado Department of Local Affairs
> 970-248-7316
Do You Yahoo!?
Free instant messaging and more at http://messenger.yahoo-com
Printed for Meredith Reckert <meredith@ci.wheatridge.co.us> 2
American Planning Association Color... spier - News and Legislative Alerts
http://www.apacolorado.or.,Ie-,islative-ncw&vestit.htm
APA Colorado Home
Summary of House Bill 99-1280: Amendments to
Colorado's Vested Rights Act
About the Colorado
Chapter
INTRODUCTION
Leaislative Alerts - News
Colorado local governments have the power to change
their zoning ordinances, subdivision regulations, and
Events and Conferences
other land use regulations from time to time. Whenever
such a change is made, however, a question arises as to
Planning Matters
whether landowners who have started the development
Career Center
approval process before the change should be allowed to
complete their development according to the old rules,
Bulletin Boards - Mailing
or should be required to conform to the new rules.
Lists
Colorado's Vested Rights Act of 1987 ('24-68-101 et
seq.) provides part of the answer to that question. The
Online Library
Act allowed local governments (cities and counties) to
Links
designate what constitutes a "site-specific development
plans (SSDP)," the approval of which gives rise to a
About the Web Site
statutory "vested right" to proceed with the development
under the terms and conditions of the approved plan for
Site Index
the next 3 years. NOTE: For a more detailed discussion
of vested rights, see the newly updated Colorado Land
Planning and Development Law (Colorado APA, 5th ed.
1998).
SUMMARY OF HB1280 AMENDMENTS
HB1280 made 3 significant changes to the 1987 Vested
Rights Act:
1. It amends the definition of SSDP to specify that
a SSDP "shall not include" the following 3 new
things: (a) "a final architectural plan;" (b) "public
utility filings;" or (c) "final construction drawings
and related documents specifying materials and
methods for construction of improvements."
These are in addition to the existing statutory
exclusions for variances, subdivision sketch plans,
and preliminary subdivision plans from the
definition. Thus, a local government may not
define a SSDP to include any of these 6 items.
2. In response to many local governments that
never implemented the 1987 Act, HB 1280
mandates that local governments shall
specifically identify, by ordinance or resolution,
what types of approvals are SSDPs that trigger
vested rights under the statute..The bill goes on to
state that if this action is not taken by January 1,
I of4 6/30/99 12:15 PM
American Planning Association Color ...apter - News and Legislative Alerts hup://www.apacolorado.orgi legislative newsivestrt.htm
2000, then "rights shall vest" upon the approval of
any plan that is "substantially similar" to the list
of plans and plats set forth in the statute's
definition of SSDP. In other words, the courts
may determine whether the plan that was
approved meets the criteria for a SSDP under the
statute--even if the local government has not
designated it as such.
3. It includes a new provision ('24-68-102.5) that
settles once and for all in Colorado the question of
what land use rules apply to applications pending
"in the pipeline" when new rules are adopted.
Under the amendment, all applications for
Wroval of a SSDP "shall be governed only by
the duly adopted laws and regulations in effect at
the time the application is submitted." "Laws and
regulations" include "any zoning law of general .
applicability" as well as other zoning and
subdivision regulations. There is an exception for
new laws/regulations which are necessary "for the
immediate preservation of the public health and
safety."
An "application" is specifically defined in
the bill as a "substantially complete"
application "in compliance with applicable
requirements established by the local
government." When approval of a SSDP
involves review and approval "in multiple
stages," application means "the original
application at the first stage in any process
that may culminate in the ultimate approval
of a Site Specific Development Plan."
WHAT HB1280 MEANS IN PRACTICAL TERMS
1. Local governments should decide which of their
plans/plats constitute a SSDP by January 1, 2000, and
adopt resolutions or ordinances to enact the
determination. If they do not, they risk litigation by
applicants to vest rights with any plan or plat approval
on the basis of statutory criteria--even if the local
government would never have defined that type of
approval as a SSDP. Local government inaction will no
longer be a loophole that can trump a claim for statutory
vested rights.
2. Once it designates what will be a SSDP, a local
government should make sure that its requirements for
any given SSDP do not include final architectural plans,
utility filings, or final construction drawings and related
documents for improvements. It is important to note that
2 of 4 6/30/99 12:15 PM
American Planning Association Color ...apter - News and Legislative Alerts
http://www.apaco lorado.orgi leoislatiee_ne~%s vestrt.htm
the bill does not preclude a local government from ever
asking to review and approve such plans and documents,
only that they may not be required for a vesting site
specific development plan.
3. Local governments can no longer react to a specific
land use application by changing the applicable rules in
midstream (which, in the opinion of many, is a good
thing). The bill appears to freeze existing zoning
classifications, subdivision, development, and design
standards at a relatively early point in time as those rules
apply to pending applications. For example, a City
designates final plat approval as triggering vested rights.
An application for sketch plan approval may be
construed as the "first stage" in a multi-stage process
leading to approval of the final plat, and thus all rules in
effect at sketch plan application would apply to review
of the "latter stage" preliminary and final plat
applications. Thus, local governments should review
carefully their current zoning and land use rules and be
sure they are specific enough to assure the amount, type,
and quality of development their citizens desire.
4. On a related note, local governments may also want
to re-designate early sketch plan or concept plan review
as "pre-application" steps in the approval process. This
may help preserve these valuable reviews as informal
and purely informational, without triggering the bill's
"lock-in" of the applicable rules at that early time. Since
the local government's flexibility is reduced once the
first or "original" application is made, it may want to
make sure that the first application is a meaningful one.
5. At the same time, local governments should carefully
spell out just what is a "substantially complete"
application for all types of development approvals that
could lead to SSDPs. This effort should include detailed
submittal requirements available in writing to all
applicants. "Substantially complete" requirements
should probably include payments of required
application fees.
6. In exchange for freezing the land use rules in place at
approval of a "first stage" application, local
governments may want to ensure that their subdivision
and zoning laws require the Applicant to take the next
steps on approved sketch or preliminary plans/plats
within a reasonable time frame. For example, many
codes require an Applicant to submit a final plat on all
or a portion of the subdivision within 12 months of
preliminary plat approval. If such action is not taken by
5 of 4 6/30/99 12:15 PM
4merican Planning Association Color ...apter - News and Legislative Alerts hap:/nvww.apacolorado.org: le=tslative_news: vestrt.htm
the Applicant, the local government may want to specify
that the prior plan approval has lapsed and that a new
application is required to start down the path to a SSDP
in the future.
Direct link to HB99-1280
Tina Axelrod of Clarion Associates in Denver compiled
this summary sheet. For more information or questions
about new House Bill 1280, please feel free to contact
Tina at 3031830-2890 or
taxelrad@clarionassociates.com.
APA Colorado Home
Last modified 18 June 1999/JMH
webmaster @ apacolorado.org
t of 4 - 6130/99 12:15 PM
0 WHEq
City of Wheat Ridge ~o
Planning and Development Department
C~: P00
Memorandum OR
TO: Meredith Reckert, Senior Planner
Sean McCartney, Planner
Chris Cramer, Intern
Martin Omer, Economic Development Specialist
Jerry Dahl, City Attorney
FROM: Alan White, Planning and Development Director (Z O
1
SUBJECT: Vested Right Legislation
DATE: June 10, 1999
On the third try and due to the enlightened leadership provided by Governor Billy-Bob, the state
has adopted vested rights, legislation. This makes it mandatory for every jurisdiction to have in
place by January 1, 2000 legislation that vests rights at the local level.
Our approach last time was to declare this a matter of local concern and simply enact legislation
that said the statute didn't apply to us. This won't work this time around. So, we need to
develop new legislation. Some new language was developed by my predecessor for the amended
PD regulations. This may be a good starting point. Jerry's office will need to help wordsmith
the legislation, but we need to decide at what point in the development process we will vest an
approval. I have typically seen a distinction in the vesting point between residential and non-
residential. When I've done this before, we looked at the very last point in the development
process prior to building permit approval as the vesting point. Also, the state legislation states
that the vesting point cannot include a requirement for final construction plans. Determining
the vesting point sounds simple, but isn't.
We have processes that apply to some projects, but not all projects. PBG's, FDP's, SDP's
CUP's, and straight zoning all complicate the determination of the vesting point. In order to
provide some common requirement for all applications, this may be an opportune time to
develop a site plan process for all but single family detached construction. Single family could
be vested at the time of final plat, but an additional issue is where we have long-standing parcels
that never went through the subdivision process. Are they vested?
I have a copy of the state legislation and the wording that was put together for PD's if you want
to review it.
I will set a meeting in the near future to discuss this legislation.
CML
1144 Sherman Street • Denver, Colorado 80203-2207 • Phone (303) 831-6411, FAX (303) 860-8175
An Analysis of HB 99-1280 Concerning Vested Property Rights
by
David W. Broadwell
CML Staff Attorney
May 27, 1999
HB 1280 in a Nutshell
FIB 99-1280--Concerning the protection of property development rights
established in property included in approved site specific development plans--
sponsored by Rep. Gary McPherson (R, Aurora) and Sen. Doug Lamborn (I,
Colorado Springs)--signed by the Governor on May 24, 1999 and effective on that
date--amends existing Colorado vested rights statutes codified at 24-68-101, et
seq.--provides that if local governments do not designate a "site specific
development plan by January 1, 2000, any of the various types of site plan
approvals set forth in the law could result in the creation of a vested right--
prohibits certain types of information from being included in the site specific
development plan--generally provides that the law in effect on the date of
application for a site specific development plan approval will control the
Background on Statutory Vested Rights
A "vested right" is a right of a landowner to proceed with a particular development with
assurance that local laws and regulations will not change in a manner that prevents the
development from occusTing or imposes new requirements on the development. The whole
debate over vested development rights centers on striking a balance between the local
government's authority to change its land use laws, and a landowner's prerogative to use and
develop his property under existing law. Debates over vested rights began brewing in the General
Assembly in the mid-1980's, principally out of a concern that the common law on estoppel and
vested rights was too heavily tilted toward the government and was unfair to landowners.'
Under the common law prior to 1987, a developer in Colorado never truly secured
a "vested right" until receiving a building permit and spending money in reliance on the permit.'
Then and only then would the developer's right to complete the development be locked in under
current local laws and regulations. In 1987 the General Assembly adopted a statute3 to enhance
the developer's ability to obtain a vested right earlier in the process upon the approval of a so-
called "site specific development plan" by a local government, and to have that right continue for
a period of at least three years. The original statute allowed local governments great leeway to
designate what sort of "site specific development plan" approval would cause rights to vest in
their own jurisdiction or to negotiate it on a case-by-case basis with developers. In response to
the 1987 enactment, many local governments adopted vesting procedures by ordinance, but some
did not.' CML research indicates that the 1987 law has been rarely invoked by developers and
has been the subject of only one significant court case.'
The original vested rights statute purports to apply to both statutory and home rule
municipalities. In the wake of its adoption, a few home rule cities adopted vesting procedures
under protest, expressly indicating their belief that the law may not be applied to them since the
Colorado Courts have traditionally viewed land use as being a matter of local concern where local
'For an excellent discussion of the developers' lament at the time, see Schwartz, Alan E.,
"Asserting Vested Rights in Colorado," 12 Colo. Law. No. 8 (Aug. 1983), p. 1100.
'See, e.g., Cline v. City of Boulder, 450 P.2d 335 (Colo. 1969); however, even a building
permit with detrimental reliance may not insulate a landowner from changes in the law by a local
government, as demonstrated in Van Sickle v. Boyes, 797 P.2d 1267 (Colo. 1990).
3SB 87-219, codified at 25-68-101, et seq., C.R.S., effective January 1, 1988. SB 219
was actually a second attempt that year to pass a vested rights law. An earlier version, SB 60,
had been vetoed by Gov. Roy Romer.
'In a CML survey conducted in 1996, 55 of 103 respondents indicated that they had
adopted a vesting ordinance. The 1987 statute did not affirmatively require the adoption of an
ordinance, and those municipalities that had not done so indicated that the reason was: (1) they
believed the statute was self-executing; or (2) they would negotiate vested rights by agreement on
a case-by-case basis as specifically allowed by the statute; or (3) they just had not gotten around
to it because a developer had never invoked the statute in their jurisdiction.
'Villa at Greeley, Inc. v. Hopper, 917 P.2d 350 (Colo. App. 1996); but see also: City of
Aspen v. Marshall, 912 P.2d 56 (Colo. 1996) and SKFinance SA v. La Plata County, 126 F.3d
1272 (10'b Cir., 1997) in which the vested rights statute is mentioned in passing.
2
law would supersede a contradictory state statute.6 To date, however, no one has actually
challenged the applicability of the statute to home rule municipalities in court.
Proponents of stronger vested rights for developers--primarily the Colorado Association
of Homebuilders--began returning to the legislature in the mid-1990's seeking to amend the 1987
statute. Minor amendments occurred in 1995, and more sweeping bills were approved by the
General Assembly but vetoed by former Governor Roy Romer in 1996 and 1997.' The premise
underlying much of this legislation was that the original 1987 vested rights statute had not been
fully implemented by local governments, and that the law needed to be strengthened to prevent
local governments from capriciously changing their land use regulations and requirements,
particularly when a landowner is going through a protracted, multi-stage approval process. The
homebuilders were especially interested in seeing something akin to a vested right occur earlier in
the process, in strengthening the remedies available when a vested right is impaired, and in having
a vested right period longer than three years.
HB 99-1280 As Introduced and As Amended
After the second veto of a vested rights bill in as many years, the bill's prime sponsor,
Rep. Gary McPherson (R, Aurora), announced in 1997 that he would return with even stronger
legislation when and if the governor's office changed hands. So, after a one year hiatus, BB 99-
1280 was introduced. The primary thrust of BB 1280 was to repeal the authority of local
governments to designate their own vesting process, and instead to mandate automatic vesting
upon the approval of any "zoning classification," any "preliminary development plan," or any
"final development plan" as defined in the bill. As with earlier versions of the legislation, the bill
was ambiguous about what vesting would actually mean at an early stage in a development review
process. (Would it mean the right to "undertake and complete the development" in accordance
with the approved plan, or simply to move on to the next stage in the approval process with the
assurance that any approval previously given would not be impaired later in the process?) The
original bill also contained many other features favorable to land developers.
Municipalities argued that the prospect of automatic, early vesting would simply compel
them to "front-load" their approval process with additional submission requirements to insure that
no development rights would be locked in until all key details and impacts of a proposed
development were known. They pointed out that this outcome would hurt both developers and
local governments. Proponents of the bill took this critique as some sort of threat, and
complained that some local governments were already "front loading" their approval process, i.e.
requiring too much detailed information before a developer would have a right to claim a vested
right under the existing statute.
'See: Broadwell, David W., "Land Use Regulation and Municipal Home Rule," Colorado
Municipalities (March, 1996).
'SB 95-126, BB 96-1303, and BB 97-1312 respectively.
CML and others engaged in intensive negotiations with the sponsors and the CAHB
throughout the legislative process in an attempt to eliminate or at least mitigate the worst aspects
of the bill.' As a result, the bill was heavily amended as it went through the process, with many
provisions being added and deleted; however, CML and other groups maintained their opposition
throughout the session because several unacceptable provisions remained in the bill. Finally, in
the last week of the session, with a very close vote looming in the Senate, Sen. Stan Matsuanka
(D, Loveland) offered a compromise and committed to vote for the bill with his amendment, thus
assuring the passage of FIB 1280. The Matsunaka amendment represented a substantially stripped
down version of the bill, incorporating three concepts that had been bandied about earlier in the
session.
HB 1280 As Adopted
Perhaps the most important aspect of the final bill is what it does not do. It does not
repeal or amend language in the existing statute which provides:
What constitutes a site specific development plan under this article that would
trigger a vested property right shall be finally determined by the local government
either pursuant to ordinance or regulation or upon an agreement entered into by
the local government and the landowner....'
Once again, the primary objective of vested rights legislation in recent years has been to take away
this authority and provide a mandatory, uniform definition of when vesting occurs. Thus, it was a
significant victory for local governments to maintain the authority embodied in this provision.
However, FIB 1280 did effect three amendments to the existing vested rights statute, marking the
first significant changes to this law since it was adopted twelve years ago.
1. Mandatory designation of a vesting process.
As explained above, not all local governments implemented the 1987 statute by formally
designating a particular type of site-specific development plan approval process that would cause
development rights to vest in their jurisdiction. Among other reasons for not doing so,
municipalities pointed to the fact that the original statute simply did not clearly require it.
Nevertheless, from the beginning CML recommended to its members that they adopt an ordinance
'It was taken as almost a foregone conclusion that the bill would be adopted in some form
since both the 1996 and 1997 versions had passed by healthy margins, the majorities in the House
and Senate had swung even more strongly in a pro-private property rights direction, and new
Governor Bill Owens had publicly announced his support for vested rights legislation.
24-68-102 (4), C.R.S.
4
establishing a vesting process anyway, lest a developer suddenly demands a vested right upon, the
approval of a subdivision plat, a P.U.D. plan, or some other land use approval, and the
municipality would be caught unexpectedly without a process for addressing the demand.
HB 1280 now adds a new provision to the statute essentially requiring that, by Jan. 1,
2000:
Each local government shall specifically identify, by ordinance or resolution, the
type or types of site specific development plan approvals within the local
government's jurisdiction that will cause rights to vest as provided in this article.
Any such ordinance or resolution shall be consistent with the provisions of this
article.
Chances are, this mandate will have little effect on the municipalities who have already adopted a
vesting procedure by ordinance, either in the wake of the original 1987 law or in the years since.
In most cases, the existing ordinance will suffice to comply with the mandate (but see the
discussion below on elements that may not be required as part of the site-specific development
plan approval process).
For municipalities that never adopted a vesting procedure by ordinance, the new mandate
decisively underscores their need to do so.10
The consequence of failing to adopt such an ordinance is this: BB 1280 provides a new
default rule which states that, if the local jurisdiction fails to meet the January 1 deadline:
...then rights shall vest upon the approval of any plan, plat, drawing, or sketch,
however denominated, that is substantially similar to any plan, plat, drawing, or
sketch listed in section 24-68-102 (4)."
This new language therefore strongly implies that, if the local government fails to establish its own
"Shortly after the adoption of the original vested rights statute, CML promulgated a
"model" vested rights ordinance for use by Colorado municipalities, a copy of which is still
available and would still be a valid method of implementation under the amended statute. The
League also has on file literally dozens of vested rights ordinances adopted by municipalities
throughout the state, ordinances which evince a variety of approaches to implementing the
original law.
24-68-102 (4) includes the following in the definition of what might be considered a
site specific development plan: "A planned unit development plan, a subdivision plat, a specially
planned area, a planned building group, a general submission plan, a preliminary or general
development plan, a conditional or special use plan, a development agreement, or any other land
use approval designation as may be utilized by a local government."
vesting procedures, a vested development right will accrue automatically, by operation of law,
upon the approval of virtually any site plan, thus carrying with it the attendant regulatory
restrictions and potential liabilities for impairment of the vested right set forth elsewhere in the
statute. Thus it is incumbent for municipalities to seize control of their own destinies by
exercising the local option afforded by the statute and definitively providing their own vesting
procedures, consistent with the letter of the statute to be sure, but also workable within the
context of their own land use regulations.
The new mandate raises at least two sets of questions for local governments that do not
comply by January 1.
First, what about the local government that has not yet adopted a local vesting procedure
before next year? Does the local government forever lose the opportunity to do so after January
1? BB 1280 could be read to say that the answer to this question is yes, again emphasizing the
need for municipalities to act now to implement the statute.
Second, no effort was made in BB 1280 to reconcile the new default langauge with
provisions in the existing statute indicating that a vested right can never accrue automatically, but
that the developer and/or the municipality must consciously choose for a vesting to occur and
invoke certain procedures. For example, current law provides that: (1) "the document that
triggers such vesting shall be so identified at the time of its approval;"" (2) a vested right can only
be established "following notice and public hearing;"" and (3) the three-year vested rights period
does not begin to run until publication of a notice officially announcing that the vested right has
been created, which publication "shall occur no later than fourteen days following approval.""
Moreover, since current law apparently provides that the creation of a vested right via the
approval of a site specific development plan is "subject to all rights of referendum," and since
referendum rights extend only to municipal legislation, some municipal attorneys believe a vested
right can only be created via a legislative act, i.e. the adoption of an ordinance.15
Thus, after January 1 in jurisdictions that have not adopted a vesting procedure, there will
12§ 24-68-102 (4), C.RS.
13§ 24-68-103 (1), C.RS.
14§ 24-68-103 (1), C.R.S.
1s§ 24-68-103 (1), C.R.S. Compare § 24-68-104 (2) which similarly provides that a
longer vesting period can be established via a development agreement, but that "Such
development agreements shall be adopted as legislative acts subject to referendum." These
provisions in the statute have caused some municipalities which normally approve site plans by
resolution to adopt vesting procedures that would necessarily require the adoption of an
ordinance as an extra step after the plan has been approved on the merits.
be a paradox in the statute: the new language implies that vesting may occur automatically upon
approval of virtually any site plan; the old language implies that various procedural steps must be
followed for vesting to truly occur and that it cannot occur by happenstance.
Once again, municipalities can avoid this ambiguity by simply adopting a local vesting
procedure consistent with the statute prior to January 1.
2 Exclusion of certain detailed information from the definition of "site specific
developmentplan."
New language has been added to the statute by BB 1280 to exclude certain items from the
definition of "site specific development plan." In particular, henceforth this term "shall not
include" the following: "a final architectural plan;" "public utility filings;" and "final construction
drawings and related documents specifying materials and methods for construction of
improvements." Earlier versions of BB 1280 contained a much longer list of items that a site
specific development plan may not include, but in the end the list was winnowed down to these
three. Throughout the process, the proponents of the bill argued that they should be able to obtain
a vested development right before making the substantial investment necessary to hire architects
and engineers to finalize every detail of a project. They complained that some local governments
were already abusing the spirit of the existing law by requiring too much final detail up front
before a developer would have the opportunity to obtain a vested development right through a
site plan approval process.16
Municipal. attorneys should carefully consider these three exceptions in light of the vesting
procedures adopted in their own communities. Reportedly, some local governments do indeed
require "final construction drawings" as part of their site-specific development plan approval
process, particularly for public "improvements" such as streets and drainage facilities. Those who
do may be subject to challenge under the amended statute.
However, an important distinction must be made: obviously, nothing in BB 1280 prevents
local governments from requiring the submission of general architectural and construction
information during the site specific development plan approval process, from requiring that "final"
information be submitted following or separate and apart from the that process, or from requiring
that final architectural and construction detail be consistent with a previously approved site
"This complaint is arguably supported by the definition of site specific development plan
included in the original statute. By definition such a plan, and the vesting that goes with it, is one
merely "describing with reasonable certainty the type and intensity of use for a specific parcel or
parcels of property." § 24-68-102 (4), C.R.S. The assertion of the proponents of BB 1280 was
that this general standard was never intended to be a license for local governments to require
"final architectural detail" or "final construction drawings" as a prerequisite for the creation of a
vested right, and instead such final detail should only be required after the approval of the site
plan but before issuance of building permits.
7
specific development plan." Sen. Matsuanka said as much on the record to clarify the legislative
intent of his amendment when SB 1280 was approved on second reading in the Senate.
3. Modification of the "pending ordinance doctrine "
To reiterate, one of the major complaints by the proponents of BB 1280 was that
developers suffer too much regulatory uncertainty, not necessarily after a site specific
development plan has been approved, but while an application for such an approval is still in the
process. Some local approval processes involve multiple steps and hearings, and some can take
many months to complete, either due to the complexity of the process, additional information
requested along the way, or changes which occur to the plan at the behest of either parry. In the
meantime, the applicant might see the "rules of the game" change while the application is pending,
or between the various stages of approval. This concern gave rise to the original language in HB
1280 that would have created a compensable vested right upon the approval of any "preliminary"
development plan, or even upon the approval of the most basic zoning.
To counter this proposal, CML suggested merely codifying the principle that an
application for approval of a site specific development plan should be governed by the law in
effect on the date of the application. This approach would be consistent not only with principles
already enunciated by the courts, as discussed below, but also with a provision in the county land
use statutes adopted in 1996.18
The codification of this principle may, however, be seen as modifying or perhaps even
eliminating the so-called "pending ordinance doctrine" as applied to the approval of site specific
development plans under the vested rights statutes.
"See § 24-68-104 (3), C.R.S., which provides: "Following approval or conditional
approval of a site specific development plan, nothing in this article shall exempt such a plan from
subsequent reviews and approvals by the local government to ensure compliance with the terms
and conditions of the original approval, if such reviews and approvals are not inconsistent with
said original approval."
"Via SB 96-61, the General Assembly had already required that any county review of a
plat or plan "shall be conducted pursuant to duly adopted county resolutions, ordinances, or
regulations that are available to the applicant prior to the commencement of such process. " §
30-28-133.5 (1), C.R.S. (emphasis supplied). This approach is also consistent with the principle
codified in SB 99-218, the so-called "takings bill" from the 1999 session, that any discretionary
conditions on land use approvals must be based on "duly adopted standards that are sufficiently
specific to ensure that the condition is imposed in a rational and consistent manner." § 29-20-203
(2), C.R.S. (emphasis supplied). For a more complete discussion of SB 218, and the numerous
supreme court decisions upon which this principle is based, see the separate memo from CML
describing SB 218.
Through the years, the Colorado courts have made a number of inconsistent
pronouncements about the existence and meaning of the pending ordinance doctrine in this state.
The most powerful statement describing and supporting the doctrine occurred in the Court of
Appeals in 1978:
This authority to enact a zoning resolution, and thereby restrict the use of
property, exists even though an application for a license involving that use is
pending, the only proviso being that the Board had not unreasonably or arbitrarily
refused or delayed issuance of the license This is particularly so where, as here,
adoption of the zoning resolution was pending at the time the application ...was
made."
However, this decision by the Court of Appeals was at odds with a longstanding Colorado
Supreme Court opinion20 holding that an applicant for a building permit "was entitled to have his
application considered under the only zoning law in force at the time." The high court based its
conclusion on the fact that, "the Constitution of Colorado provides that no law `retrospective in
its operation' shall be passed by the General Assembly. What the legislature cannot do at the
state level in this connection, the city council cannot do in municipal affairs."
Adding to the confusion was another decision by the Court of Appeals21 in 1989
apparently concurring with the Supreme Court ruling in the earlier case and noting that, "As a
general rule, the mere pendency of a zoning amendment at the time that an application for a
permit is made does not furnish a proper basis upon which to deny the permit," but then going on
to say, "the fact that a landowner may be entitled to a permit does not necessarily entitle him to
exercise the rights granted by that permit in the face of subsequently adopted legislation."
Given the uncertainty over the pending ordinance doctrine, some municipalities have
tended to take the conservative course when adopting new land use laws or amending existing
laws, and have applied the new or amended laws only to applications submitted after the effective
date of the new ordinance. However, under the pending ordinance doctrine, municipalities have
always had the argument that a newly adopted ordinance can be applied to applications already in
the pipeline but not yet acted upon, particularly where the application was submitted while the
"Crittenden v. Hasser, 585 P.2d 928, 929 (Colo. App., 1978), (citations omitted). In
National Advertising Company v. City and County of Denver, 912 F. 2nd 405(10 Ih Cir., 1990),
the federal court observed that the holding in Crittenden actually constituted a "variation" of the
pending ordinance doctrine as it is understood under the common law in other states. The
Colorado Supreme Court flirted with but ultimately declined to adopt the pending ordinance
doctrine in City of Aspen v. Marshall, 912 P.2d 56 (Colo., 1996).
"City and County of Denver v. Deriver Buick, Inc., 141 Colo. 121, 347 P.2d 919 (1959).
21Gramiger v. County of Pitkin, 794 P.2d 1045 (Colo. App. 1989).
9
new ordinance was actually "pending" in some sense of the word before municipal decision
makers. BB 1280 would now appear to resolve the confusion once and for all, at least insofar as
an application for a site specific development plan approval is involved. The bill definitively
provides that the application will be acted upon in accordance with laws and regulations in
existence when the application was originally submitted.
Several nuances to this new requirement are worth noting.
Notwithstanding the general rule, CML sought and obtained an exception that still allows
local governments to adopt laws or regulations necessary for "the immediate preservation of
public health and safety"' and apply these kinds of ordinances to previously submitted
applications for development plan approval that have not yet been acted upon. Therefore, the
pending ordinance doctrine is preserved to this limited extent.
The requirement that the law in effect at the time of application will govern the application
was obviously added to protect developers. But, as a practical matter, the question may also arise
as to whether it may also work against developers under some circumstances. For example, what
if the local government wants to change its laws after an application is submitted in some manner
that is actually advantageous to the developer/applicant? Can the developer/applicant waive his
or her rights under the statute? Will opponents of the project have standing to complain that the
application must be governed by the prior law in effect at the time of application? Such questions
may be rendered moot if, in the face of a challenge, the developer simply resubmits the application
for site specific development plan approval to take advantage of changes to the law that may
work in the developer's favor.
The new requirement may also provoke questions about what remedy exists in the event a
local government attempts to enforce an after-adopted ordinance in relationship to a pending
application. Arguably, the only remedy available to the applicant will be to appeal the decision
under C.R.C.P. 106 (a)(4) and seek a obtain a reversal on the theory that the local government
abused its discretion and exceeded its jurisdiction in light of the new restrictions in the statute.
The developer may also have recourse to declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the after-
adopted regulation from being applied to his or her project. However, significantly, the damage
remedies included in the existing vested right statute (entitling the landowner to compensation for
reliance damages if an established vested right is ever impaired by the local government)' was not
expanded by HB 1280 and would therefore not apply to the new provisions of the statute
addressing how the ".application" for a site specific development plan approval must be treated.
22 This term is not defined in HB 1280; however, the courts have traditionally been fairly
deferential to municipal determinations about whether a particular ordinance is necessary for the
"immediate preservation of the public health and safety." See, e.g., Colorado Auto Auction
Services Corp. v. City of Commerce City, 800 P.2d 998 (Colo. 1990).
'See § 24-68-105 (1)(c) and Villa at Greeley v. Hopper, supra, n. 5.
10
An obvious problem that may be engendered by the new language in the statute is that,
when a municipality is considering a significant change to its land use laws, some landowners may
be tempted to rush in with an "application" for a site specific development plan approval simply to
"lock in" their rights under the prior law. CML attempted to address this problem in the bill by
including a definition of "application" that would favor the local government. For example, the
League proposed that if an application is to trigger certain rights under the law, it should be
"complete"and not some sort of sham submittal. As adopted, HB 1280 provides that the
application must be "substantially complete.s24 BB 1280 also preserves to local governments full
authority to establish their own application requirements, and therefore implicitly places the onus
on the applicant to meet those requirements if the applicant wishes to claim the rights afforded by
the new provisions in the statute.
Finally, since an application may be deemed to "lock in" the law in existence at the time it
is submitted, it becomes more imperative than ever for the municipality to define when an
application will be deemed to have lapsed or to have been abandoned. For example, a landowner
may initiate the approval process with some sort of preliminary application then go back to the
drawing board. Many years later, the landowner or the landowner's successors in interest may
resurface and attempt to resume the process, claiming they are not subject to any changes in local
law which may have occurred since the original application was submitted and that they should
not be required to go back to square one." Once again, BB 1280 does not impair the authority
of municipalities to structure their application process in any way they may choose, including the
prerogative to say in their regulations how diligently an application must be pursued before it is
deemed to have lapsed. Municipal officials can and should exercise their authority to ensure that
long-dormant applications are not revived unexpectedly.
Summary and Recommendations
In light of the amendments made to the existing vested rights statutes by BB 99-1280,
municipalities should consider the following recommendations:
1. Prior to January 1, 2000, municipalities that have not already done so should seriously
"The term "substantially complete" is not defined in the bill. A literalist might argue that
the term is an oxymoron, "complete" is an absolute term, an application is either complete or it
isn't. If the meaning of the term is ever litigated, chances are the parties may turn for guidance to
other laws that use the similar term "substantial completion" (e.g., § 13-80-104, C.R.S. providing
that "substantial completion" of a project is the point at which the statute of repose begins to run
for claims against architects and engineers) or the innumerable decisions that define the terms
"substantial" and "complete" in other contexts.
"A similar issue is currently pending before the Colorado Supreme Court in Save Park
County v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Park, 98 CJ C.A.R. 1095 (Colo.
App. 1998); cert. granted (1999).
11
consider adopting a vested rights ordinance specifically identifying what type of site specific
development plan approval will be deemed to create a vested development right in their
jurisdiction.
2. Prior to January 1, 2000, municipalities that have already adopted a vested rights
ordinance in response to the original vested rights statute should double check to make sure that
their ordinance is truly "consistent" with the statute. Particular attention should be paid to
whether or not the municipality requires information such as "final architectural plans" or "final
construction drawings" to be submitted as part of the site specific development plan approval
process because such requirements may provide fodder for a claim that the local procedures are
not "consistent" with the state law.
3. All municipalities should be cognizant of the fact that the local laws in effect at the time
of application for a site specific development plan will generally govern the review and approval
of the application. Although FIB 1280 does not impair the authority of municipalities to adopt
and amend land use regulations generally, it may prevent them from doing so in a reactionary way
after an application is already in the pipeline. Thus, the new law places a premium on planning
and regulating pro-actively. Municipal officials should also pay particular attention to local laws
which address the sufficiency of an application for a site specific development plan approval, and
the circumstances under which an application will be deemed to be abandoned or lapsed if the
applicant does not diligently pursue it.
12
I"y ?
It 9.x JJ
HOUSE BILL 99-1280
BY REPRESENTATIVES McPherson, Dean, King, Larson, May,
McElhany, McKay, Paschall, Pfiffner, Spradley, Stengel, Taylor, and
T. Williams;
also SENATORS Lamborn, Congrove, Epps, Musgrave, and Tebedo.
CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF PROPERTY DEVELOPME\rI RIGHTS
ESTABLISHED IN PROPERTY INCLUDED N APPROVED SITE SPECIFIC
DEVELOPMENT PLANS.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Colorado:
SECTION 1. 24-68-102 (1) and (4), Colorado Revised Statutes, are
amended, and the said 24-6S-102 is further amended BY THE ADDITION
OF ANEW SUBSECTION, to read:
24-68-102. Definitions. As used in this aricie. unless the context
otherwise requires:
(1) g
LL. = a r/ VtJ L.i L', LLl.' L.L dc 4 L.11 J, LLL. L. . . L.J01 ~1 l.r L...
.,.,...,'_.,y L.., "APPLICATION" IvfEP?JS A SUSS T A,ti l lALLY COMPLETE
APPLICATION FOR APPROVAL OF A SITE SPECIFIC DE-'ELOPMEN i PLAN TH A T
HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO A LOCAL GOtiERN3ME-N N COMPLI.-.NCE WITH
PPLICABLE REQUIREMENTS ES T 4BLISHED BY THE LOCAL GONERN-v SE,VT. FOR
Carpal letters indicate new m; to al added to existing s antes, dashes t.}scugh words indicate
de=.crs from e~is irz sa-tutes and such material not pan of a^..
LOCAL. GOVERNMENTS THAT HAVE PROVIDED FOR THE REV1E%V AND
APPROVAL OF SITE SPECIFIC DEVELOPMENT PLANS N MULTIPLE STAGES,
".APPLICATION" MEANS THE ORIGNAL APPLICATION AT THE FIRST STAGE N
ANY PROCESS THAT MAY CULMINATE N THE ULTIMATE APPROVAL, OF A SITE
SPECIFIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN.
(1.5) "LANDOWNER" MEANS ANY OWNER OF A LEGAL OR EQUITABLE
INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY, AND INCLUDES THE HEIRS, SUCCESSORS, AND
ASSIGNS OF SUCH OWNERSHIP INTERESTS.
(4) (a) "Site specific development plan" means a plan Mikh THAT
has been submitted to a local government by a landowner or Iris SUCH
LANDOWNER'S representative describing with reasonable certainty the type
and intensity of use for a specific parcel or parcels of property. Such plan
may be in the form of. but need not be limited to, any of the following plans
or approvals: A planned unit development plan, a subdivision plat, a
specially planned area, a planned building group, a general submission plan,
a preliminary or general development plan, a conditional or special use
plan, a development agreement, or any other land use approval designation
as may be utilized by a local government. What constitutes a site specific
development plan under this article that would trigger a vested property
right shall be finally determined by the local government either pursuant to
ordinance or regulation or upon an agreement entered into by the local
government and the landowner. and the document that triggers such vesting
shall be so identified at the time of its approval. vV
(b) .
"Site specific development plan" shall not include : r dcfhic
A VARD NCE, a preliminary plan as
defined in section 30-28-101 (6), C.R.S., OR ANY OF THE FOLLOWING:
(1) A SKETCH PLAN AS DEFINED N SECTION 30-28-101 (8), C.R.S.;
(II) A FINAL ARCHITECTUR-kL PLAN;
(III) PUBLIC UTILITY FILINGS; OR
(IV) FINAL CONSTRUCTION DRAWINGS AND RELATED DOCUMENTS
SPECIFYING MATERIALS AND METHODS FOR CONSTRUCTION' OF
IMPROVEMENTS.
SECTION 2. Article 63 of title 24, Colorado Revised Statutes, is
amended BY THE ADDITION OF A NEW SECTION to read:
PAGE 2-HOUSE BILL 99-1280
24-68-102.5. Applications - approval by local government.
(l) EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN SUBSECTION (2) OF THIS SECTION,
.AN APPLICATION FOR APPROVAL OF A. SITE SPECIFIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN AS
WELL AS THE APPROVAL., CONDITIONAL APPROVAL. OR DENIAL. OF APPROVAL
OF THE PLAN SHALL BE GOVERNED ONLY BY THE DULY =.DOPTED LAWS.AND
REGULATIONS IN EFFECT AT THE TIME THE APPLICATION IS SUBMITTED TO A
LOCAL. GOVERN\-IENT. FOR PURPOSES OF THIS SECTION. "LAWS A\D
REGULATIONS" INCLUDES ANY ZONING LAW OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY
.ADOPTED BY A LOCAL. GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS ANY ZONING OR
DEVELOPMENT REGULATIONS THAT HAVE PREVIOUSLY BEEN ADOPTED FOR
THE PARTICULAR PARCEL DESCRIBED IN THE PLAN AND THAT REMAIN IN
EFFECT AT THE TIME OF THE APPLICATION FOR APPROVAL, OF THE PLAN.
(2) NOTWITHSTANDNG THE LIMITATIONS CON i AWED IN SUBSECTION
(1) OF THIS SECTION, A LOCAL. GOVERNMENT MAY ADOPT A NEW OR
AMENDED LAW OR REGULATION WHEN NECESSARY FOR THE IMNIEDIATE
PRESERVATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY AND MAY ENFORCE SUCH
LAW OR REGULATION N RELATION TO APPLICATIONS PENDING AT THE TI,NIE
SUCH LAW OR REGULATION IS ADOPTED.
SECTION 3. 24-63-103 Colorado Revised Statutes. is amended
to read:
24-65-103. Vested property right - establishment - «•aiver.
(1) (a) EACH LOCAL GOVERNMENT SHALL SPECIFICALLY" IDENTIFY, BY
ORDNANCE OR RESOLUPION, THE TYPE OR TYPES OF SITE SPECIFIC
DEVELOPMENT PLAN APPROVALS «'ITHN THE LOCAL. GOVERNMENT'S
JURISDICTION THAT WILL CAUSE PROPERTY' RIGHTS TO VEST AS PROVIDED N
THIS ARTICLE. ANY SUCH ORDINANCE OR RESOLUTION SHALL BE CONSISTENT
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ARTICLE. EFFECTIVE JP.\Z;ARY 1, 2000, IF A
LOCAL GOVERNMENT HAS NOT ADOP TED AN ORDNANCE OR RESOLUTION
PURSUANTTO SECTION 24-68-102 (4) SPECIFYING WHAT CONSTITUTES A SITE
SPECIFIC DEVELOP,NIENT PLAN THAT WOULD TRIGGER A VESTED PROPERTY
RIGHT, THEN RIGHTS SHALL VEST UPON THE APPROVAL OF A\'Y PLAN, PLAT.
DRAWING, OR SKETCH, HOWEVER DENOMINATED, THAT IS SUESTANTIALLY"
SIMILAR TO ANY PLAN, PLAT; DRAWING, OR SKETCH LISTED IN SECTION
24-68-102 (4).
(b) A vested property right shall be deemed established with respect
to any property upon the approval, or conditional approval., ofa site specific
development plan, following notice and public hearing. by the local
government in which the propern• is situated.
PAGE 3-HOUSE BILL 99-1380
(c) S t-h A vested propem right shall attach to and run NN ith the
applicable propem• and shall confer upon the landowner the right to
undertake and complete the development and use of said propem under the
teens and conditions of the site specific development plan including in,
amendments thereto. A local goverrnntent ntae approve a site specific
development plan upon such terms and conditions as mae reasonable be
necessan to protect the public health. safety. and welfare. Such conditional
approval shall result in a vested propene right. althouch failtue to abide be
such terms and conditions Neill result in a forfeiture of vested propett~
rights. A site specific development plan shall be deemed approved upon the
effective date of the local :overnment le=a1 action, resolution, or ordinance
relating thereto. Such approval shall be subject to all rights of referendum
and judicial review:. except that the period of time permitted by law for the
exercise of such rights shall not begin to run until the date of publication,
in a newspaper of general circulation within the jurisdiction of the local
government granting the approval, of a notice advising the general public
of the site specific development plan approval and creation of a vested
propem right pursuant to this article. Such publication shall occur no later
than fourteen days following approval.
PAGE 4-HOUSE BILL 99-1280
SECTION' 4. Safetc clause. The eeneral assemble her,,b% finds,
det'--mines, and declares that this act is necessary for the imr;ediat;
preservation of the public peat.-. health. and safer.c.
GL`~~
Russell Geor¢
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES
Rai P m erg
PP~ESIDENT OF
THE SENATE
e
udith M. Rodriuue
CHIEF CLERK OF THE USE
OF REPRESENT.' TIY'S
-kl ,D"*
Patricia K. Dicks
SECRETARY OF
THE SENATE
APPROVED y"l 2~ 1SS CC F 11 7yv~
Bill Owens
GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF COLORADO
PAGE HOUSE BILL 99-1280
Case No.:
OA9906 Quarter Section Map No.:
,
i'
App: Last Name:
City of Wheat Ridge _Related Cases:
R
App: First Name:
; Case History:
he state has adopted
Owner: Last Name
~ested rights legislation
making it mandatory for
-
Owner: First Name:
every jurisdiction to have
,
App Address:
City, State Zip:
Review Body:
Plannin _¢ommission
App: Phone:
Review Date:
11/11811°999
Owner Address:
2nd Review Body:
Qty Council
City/State/Zip:
! 2nd Review Date:
11/22/1999 _
Owner Phone:
Approval Body:
Cit Council -
Project Address:
Approval Date:
12/13/1999
Street Name:
Reso/Ordinance No.:
City/State, Zip
Case Disposition:
Project Planner:
File Location:
Notes:
Follow-Up:
Conditions of Approval
hite
Active
r'
u£'~