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HomeMy WebLinkAboutZOA-92-2 HAYES, PHILLIPS & MALONEY, P.C. Attorneys at Law Suite 450, The Market Center 1350 Seventeenth Street Denver, Colorado 80202-1517 (303) 825-6444 Telecopier. (303) 825-1269 John E. Hayes Herbert C. Phillips CITY OF WHEAT RIDGE James S. Maloney MEMORANDIIM TO: Mayor and City Council FROM: John E. Hayes, City Attorney ~/~"~ DATE: August 21, 1992 RE: Sign Code Enforcement M. Susan Lombardi Scott W. Smith On Tuesday and Wednesday, August 18 and 19, 1992, an issue has arisen relating to the enforceability and enforcement practices of various provisions of the City's Sign Code (Article IV of Chapter 26 of the City's Code of Laws) as the same relates to political signs. Much public interest has been raised regarding this issue, including exposure in all of the major media in Denver and, contact of me by the American Civil Liberties Union, and telephone contact to me by practically every member of the City Council and senior staff of the administration. Because this has become such a high visibility question, and because it is obvious that the Council, and indeed elements of the citizenry of Wheat Ridge, are as concerned and divided on this question as they are, I feel it__is incumbent to reduce my opinion in this matter to writing. , My opinion as set forth herein is based completely upon the facts of the matter as I understand them to be, or as they have been represented to me. In the event these facts, or any of them, prove to be different than as I understand them or have had them represented to me, the substance of my opinion which follows could be affected. The City has validly adopted its Sign Code_as Sections 26-401, et sew. of the City's Code of Laws. Within that Code of Laws, all signs, except for certain signs which are specifically exempted, require a permit before they may be placed or erected. Section 26- 4D7(10) specifically exempts from regulation "political campaign signs and temporary produce sales signs, when in accordance with this article." (See Section 26-41D(n)). Said Section 26-410(n) relates to temporary signs, and provides ,that such signs are allowed subject to five specific conditions, two of which are: a . (1) One per street frontage and setback at least ten (10) feet from street right-of-way line . (3) Political campaign signs may be located on property only by permission of the landowner All such signs shall be removed within seven (7) days after election. In anticipation of the public hearing scheduled for August 24, 1992, relating to the design of West 38th Avenue between Carr Street and Kipling Street, numerous signs, containing writings which relate to various citizens' rights and positions regarding that public hearing, have been placed along West 29th Avenue, West 32nd Avenue, and West 38th Avenue. A substantial number, if not most, of those signs appear to be located less than ten feet from the designated right-of-way of City streets. The content of the signs is devised in such a way that four consecutively placed signs each contain a one-line message, which, when all four are read .together, state a political message. Therefore, even though I have been urged to find otherwise, I find that, for purposes of this opinion, the signs in question are in fact "temporary" signs which contain a protected political message, and are therefore exempt from permit requirements as set out in the City's Code of Laws, so long as the locational and durational provisions of Section 26-410(n) cited herein are complied with. The City's Sign Code, on its face, contains no limit whatsoever on the message or content which may be exhibited on a protected political sign. Indeed, were any such limitation, either direct or indirect, to exist the Sign Code would be per se unconstitutional. As related to me, the City's Code Enforcement staff, during the course of its normal City-wide inspection duties, noticed certain of these signs in the City's right-of-way, and began to remove the same as being in violation of the City's Code of Laws. When the name of Councilmember Selstad was found upon the signs, removal of the signs ceased until Councilmember Selstad was contacted. Thereafter, the City, according to several Councilmembers, has received a number of complaints about the number and location of the signs, and this issue was at that point brought to my attention-for rendering of my opinion on this matter. As this matter has developed (and unfortunately escalated), it is clear that there are two distinct, but related, issues which require resolution.. One of those issues, whether or not the City's Sign Code as written violates First Amendment free speech protections, is a legal issue upon which I feel very comfortable rendering an unqualified legal opinion. The second issue, whether or not the provisions of the Wheat Ridge Sign Code have been enforced, or applied, in such a manner as to.comply with First 2 ., Amendment free speech requirements, requires some analysis of fact, and thereby renders any opinion subject to the truth and reliability of the facts relied upon. I will, however, based upon the information which I have been provided and which I reasonably believe to be true, attempt to answer both questions. The first question regards the enforceability of the City's regulations relating to political signs when measured against First Amendment protections. As will be cited below, freedom of expression is the rule, and government at any level may not regulate the content of that free expression except in very limited circumstances. If any such regulation, either on its face or as applied, restricts speech,. that regulation will be violative of the First and/or Fourteenth Amendment protections afforded all citizens by the United States Constitution. Fortunately, the legal issues in this matter are not being decided in a vacuum. In 1984 the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 787, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772_(1984). That case contains facts which are very close to the applicable facts in this case, and thus provides clear guidance for the City's actions, and for determining my opinion, in this matter. In the Vincent case, the City of Los Angeles had adopted a provision of its municipal code prohibiting the posting of signs on public property. Vincent, a candidate for the Los Angeles City Council, contracted with a company which produced cardboard signs and attached them to utility poles at various locations within the City. The City's staff, acting in the normal course of their activities under the adopted ordinance, removed those signs, together with a number of other signs, which had been placed or posted upon public property. Some of those other removed signs were political in nature, while others were purely commercial, or non-political. Vincent's political committee sued .in Federal Court, seeking an injunction that the prohibition against posting political advertising on public property was violative of the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech, and asking that the ordinance in question be declared unconstitutional. The District. Court found for the City, thereby finding the ordinance constitutional. ..The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding the ordinance unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of the United States accepted the case and ruled that the ordinance in question -was constitutional, both on its face and as applied to Vincent. Because the holdings in the Vincent case are so germane to this matter, extended quotations from the Supreme Court's opinion (joined in by six justices) will be made in this memorandum. 3 In rejecting the challenge that the ordinance in question inhibited the free exchange of political ideas, the Court stated: The ordinance prohibits appellees (Vincent) from communicating with the public in a certain manner, and presumably diminishes the total quality of their communications in the City. It has been clear since this Court's earliest decisions concerning the freedom of speech that the state may sometimes curtail speech when necessary to advance a significant and legitimate state interest. There are some purported interests- -such as a desire to suppress support for a minority party or an unpopular cause, or to exclude the expression of certain points of view from the market place of ideas- -that are so plainly illegitimate that they would immediately invalidate the rule. The general principle is that the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others. (citations omitted) . In United States v. O'Brien, (citation omitted), the Court set forth the appropriate framework for reviewing a viewpoint-neutral regulation of this kind: 'A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.' The Court then went on to affirm the City of Los Angeles' power to regulate aspects of free speech based upon aesthetic considerations. It is well settled that the state may legitimately exercise its police powers to advance aesthetic values Metro Media. Inc y San Dieao, (citation omitted) dealt with San Diego's prohibition of certain forms of outdoor billboards. There the court considered the City's interest in avoiding visual clutter, and seven justices explicitly concluded that this interest was sufficient to justify a prohibition of billboards Justice White, writing for the plurality, expressly concluded that the City's aesthetic interests were sufficiently substantial to provide an acceptable justification -for a content-neutral prohibition against the use of bulletin boards; San Diego's interest in its appearance was undoubtedly a substantial governmental goal We reaffirm the conclusion of the majority in Metro Media. Against the challenge that Los Angeles' ordinance's prohibition against posting political messages on public property eliminated a most effective .way of disseminating political ideas, the Court held: While the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to employ every conceivable method of communication at all times and in all places -(citations omitted) a restriction on expressive activity may be invalid if the remaining modes of- communication are inadequate. (citations omitted) The Los Angeles ordinance does not affect any individual's freedom to exercise the right to speak and to distribute literature in the same place where the posting of signs on public property is prohibited. TA the extent that the posting of signs on public property has advantages over these forms of expression (citations omitted) there is no reason to believe that-the same advantages cannot be obtained through other means. Finally, and perhaps prophetically, the Court answered the charge that a less severe type of regulation could be enacted and enforced by stating: Finally, (Vincent) argues that Los Angeles could have written an ordinance that would have had a less severe effect on expressive activity such as theirs, by permitting the posting of any kind of sign at any time on some types of public property, or by making a variety of other more specific exceptions to the ordinance: for signs carrying certain types of messages (such as political campaign signs), for signs posted during specific time periods (perhaps during political campaigns), for particular locations (perhaps for areas already cluttered by an excessive number of signs on adjacent private property), or for signs meeting design specifications (such as size or color). Plausible public policy arguments might well be made in support of any such exception, but it by no means follows that it is therefore constitutionally mandated (citations omitted) nor is it clear that some of the suggested exceptions would even be constitutionally permissible. For example, even though political speech is entitled to the fullest possible measure of constitutional protection, there are a host of other communications that command the same respect. An assertion that "Jesus Saves," that "Abortion is Murder," that every woman has the "Right to Choose," or that "Alcohol Ki11s," may have a claim to a constitutional exemption from the ordinance that is just as strong as,"Roland Vincent--City Council." To avoid 5 an exception for appellees' political speech and not these other types of speech might create a risk of engaging in constitutionally forbidden content discrimination. These citations, lengthy as they are, are specifically applicable to the controversy in this case. Part of the justification of the Wheat Ridge City Council in enacting the Sign Code is "to promote traffic safety and the free movement of traffic, and protect the public from the hazardous conditions which result from signs that obscure or distract the vision of motorists, bicyclists and pedestrians; to provide a balance between legitimate identification and advertising needs and a visual discord which signs sometimes cause, and to insure that adequate and effective advertising signage opportunities exist within a regulatory framework which protects the constitutionally-guaranteed right of free speech." It also must be remembered that the Sign Code is a portion of the City's land use regulation, another portion of which is the Zoning Code which seeks to protect. the aesthetic values as well as safe traffic flow within the City. These are legitimate, recognized governmental objectives which were sustained in the Vincent case. Additionally, the Wheat Ridge Sign Code is devoid of any regulation of the content or message contained on political signs. The durational and locational regulation of those signs appears to fit within the acceptable parameters as established by the Vincent and Metro Media oases, while retaining the Sign Code's complete content neutrality. On these bases, I am very comfortable in giving my opinion that the Wheat Ridge Sign Code, as written, is constitutional and enforceable in its minimal .regulation upon the location and duration of display of political signs. The second question presented relates to the application and enforcement of the Sign Code as written. Specifically, issues of- disparate enforcement of that Sign Code have been raised, it being specifically alleged that previous political signs have been allowed to be placed in precisely the location where the complained-of signs are now located, but that those previous signs (most of which endorsed specific candidates, some of whom now serve on the Council or in other elective positions) were allowed to remain. Clearly, the implication of such an allegation is that the only difference between the signs which were allowed to remain and the signs which are being asked to be removed relate to the message contained on the sign, which, if true, constitutes a constitutionally impermissible basis for regulation. As stated above, the answer to this question is fact-specific. To have enforcement sustained as constitutional, the provisions of the Sign Code must be enforced in a content-neutral manner. If in 6 fact the Sign Code is being enforced selectively, or based upon the content of, or message contained on, any sign, the City's Sign Code will fail the constitutional "as applied" test. The information which I have been provided by the City's staff is as follows: The City routinely removes, on no less than a weekly basis, signs of any sort, without regard to commercial or non-commercial content, which appear in the public right-of-way. Such removal is made without notice. However, political signs are removed without notice if they violate the City's sight triangle provisions, as set forth in the Zoning Code. Other political 2 signs, however, are removed only upon 24 hour notice as provided in Section 26-404 of the City's Code of Laws. Although it is vigorously disputed by others, the City's staff has advised me that political signs have been removed from the public right-of-way, upon notice, in the past; however, it is candidly admitted by the City's staff that not every political sign located within the right-of-way has been so removed. There are, however, factual differences between this complained-of situation and past election campaigns which may make this situation factually and legally differentiatable from previous situations. Specifically, it is alleged that a substantially greater number of signs had been placed relating to this issue than would normally be placed prior to an election, some of which were allegedly placed after notice of the City's concern regarding their location was received. Additionally, because of the larger number of signs which are placed, i. e. more than one per street frontage, both of the criteria set forth in Section 26-410(n)(1) may be being violated in this instance. Also, the signs presently in question are clearly not "candidate" signs relating to a particular. election. Many of these factual circumstances can be debated as to their accuracy and overall relevance. For the purpose of my opinion, I have given these alleged differences little weight, instead considering this matter on the basis that "one political sign is like any other." For purposes of this opinion, I must assume that the City has, in the past, reasonably attempted to enforce the provisions of the Sign Code in an even-handed, consistent manner. To the extent that the City has not so enforced the Sign Code in the past, the enforceability of the City's ordinance in the future (not just in this instance) is threatened. However, based upon the assumption that enforcement has in the past, and will continue in the future to be, even-handed and consistent, I feel I have no choice but to advise the City to continue to enforce the provisions of the ordinance with specific disregard to who places the sign, or what the sign may communicate. 7 It is to be clearly noted that this opinion only relates to the regulation of the public's right-of-way. No question has been raised, and no opinion a.s rendered, regarding the enforceability or applicability of ,the City's Sign Code provisions to private property. Indeed, solely for purposes of enforcing the City's Sign Code, consistent standards need to be applied regarding the location of the City's right-of-way, and the corresponding beginning of private property ownership. To avoid a "vagueness" argument, I therefore recommend that the ten foot limit set forth in the ordinance be measured, for these enforcement purposes only, from the end of the established, constructed right-of-way (i.e. the end of street pavement or sidewalk). This interpretation allows for consistent enforceability, and gives all property owners the same level of knowledge of the commencement of the public right- of-way. Clearly, such an interpretation does not in any way change the area of the City's legally-owned right-of-way, nor does it impair or negate the City's right to make improvements within that legally-owned right-of-way. Great care must be taken in enforcing this ordinance to assure that the legitimate, protected free speech rights of private citizens, especially as the same relate to utilization of their private property, are protected. M E M O R A N D U M TO: John Hayes, City Attorney FROM: Glen Gidley, Director o£ Planning & Development RE: Political Signs DATE: October 28, 1992 Please review the attached proposed amendment to the Sign Code regarding political signs. There is no pride of authorship, so feel free to rip it to shreds if needed.. After L receive your comments, changes or.confetti, 1 will schedule it-for public hearing before .Planning Commission first, then refer it to council, unless you think we should go first to council study session. GEG:slw attachment cc: ~B~_-Middaugh, City Administrator HAYES, PHILLIPS & MALONEY, P.C. Attorneys at Law Suite 450, The Mazket Center 1350 Seventeenth Street Denver, Colorado 80202-1517 (303) 825-6444 Telecopier: (303) 825-1269 John E. Hayes Herbert C. Phillips James S. Maloney CITY OF WHEAT RIDGE ~lTY OF WHEAT RIDGE ~ D c~~nrta~? NOV 2 01992 ' ~~~~ii^^~r . V~ .. ' PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT M. Susan Lombardi Scott W. Smith Of Counsel Kathleen E. Haddock TO: GLEN GIDLEY-, DIRECTOR OF PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT G~ FROM: JOHN E. HAYES, CITY ATTORNEY DATE: NOVEMBER 19, 1992 UU RE: POLITICAL SIGNS After reviewing your October 28, 1992 memorandum, I have the following suggestions: 1. In the definition of "political sign'! in Section 1 of the proposed ordinance, I-think the last two 'lines should read as follows: . to a specific political campaign or election or any other issue of public concern which is protected. by the First Amendment's right of free speech. 2. In Section 2 of the ordinance, under (5) Political Signs, I would modify that slightly to read as follows: (a) Location: Must be located on private property only, with permission of the land owner. Such signs are prohibited upon or within public rights-of-way. Where it is difficult to determine the public right-of-way boundary due to lack of curb, gutter, and/or sidewalk, or survey markers, such boundaries shall be presumed to be ten (10) feet from the edge of pavement or back of curb. Where a sidewalk exists, such boundaries shall be assumed to be two (2) feet from outside edge of sidewalk. 3. Under subpart (c) of (5) Political Signs, I suggest that we delete the last sentence. As it is written, it appears that a sign could be up for 29 days, taken down for one day, then replaced for 29, taken down for one, etc. If we really wish to limit the total time period during which a political sign may be placed on private property, we should make it an absolute maximum number of days, although I am somewhat doubtful as to-the constitutionality of such a limit. Please call if you have any other questions. M E M O R A N D U M TO: lanning Commission FROM: Glen Gidley, Director of Planning & Development RE: Case No. ZOA-92-2 Proposed Amendment to Sign Code, Article IV. pertaining to "Political Signs" DATE: February 5, 1993 The attached Council Bill is a proposal to amend Wheat Ridge Code of .Laws, Section 26-403 and 410 relating to "political signs". This proposal has been initiated by staff (City Administrator and City Attorney) subsequent to issues that arose during discussions surrounding the West 38th Avenue reconstruction project. There was conflict and confusion over the interpretation of the existing provisions when applied to several political signs placed within city street right-of-way. Hence, we have proposed to add a new definition of "Political Sign" since it was not previously defined. (Section 1. of Council Bill) Then, we added specific provisions for political signs (Section 2.) under subsection (5). John Hayes, City Attorney, has reviewed this proposal and his recommended revisions are included in this Council Bill. SUGGESTED MOTION• I move that Case No. ZOA=92-2 be accepted as submitted and forwarded on to City Council with a recommendation for Approval. GEG:slw attachment NOTICE'OF PUBLIC HEARING Notice is hereby given that a Public Hearing is to be held before the City of Wheat Ridge Planning Commission on February 18, 1993 at 7:30 p.m. at 7500 West 29th Avenue, Wheat Ridge, Colorado. All interested citizens are invited to speak at the Public Hearing or submit written comments. The following petitions shall be heard: 1. - - ZOA-92-2c-- A proposal to amend Wheat Ridge Code of Laws, Chapter 26. Article IV. Sign Code pertaining to "Political Signs". 2. Case No ZOA-92-3• A proposal to amend Wheat Ridge Code of Laws, Chapter 26. Zoning and Development, Subsection 31. Off- Street Parking Requirements, regarding parking of motorized and nonmotorized camping vehicles within public rights-of- way. h. San ra Wiggins, S etary ATTEST: Wanda Sang, City Clerk To be Published: February 4, 1993 Wheat Ridge Sentinel <pc>pnzoa922/923 M E M O RAN D U M TO: Tanning Commission FROM: Glen Gidley, Director of Planning and Development RE: Case No. ZOA-92-2 DATE: April 8, 1993 This case was originally scheduled for public. hearing on February 18, 1993. The hearing was continued to April 15, 1993 so that Staff and our-City Attorney could consider revised language. The attached proposed Council Bill includes those revisions. I have attached my original memo to you, dated February 5, for reference. GEG:slw attachments Planning Commission Minutes April 15, 1993 Page 6 many of the neighborhood concerns are not warranted. He noted that the tracks can be fun and educational. Irene Ga1veG stated when making comparisons of loud music, jackhammers, lawnmowers and chainsaws to the sound produced by the proposed ten to 12 go-karts, the main difference is that lawnmowers, chainsaws or loud music can be turned off. Commissioner QUALTERI moved that Case No. SUP-93-2, an application by JoAnn and Orlando Martinez for approval of a Special Use Permit to allow a go-kart track with concession on C-1 zoned property at 4075 Kipling Street be Denied for the following reasons: 1. The site plan does not provide adequate buffering and does not function properly in regard to access and parking. 2. The proposed use is incompatible with adjacent development and potential land use in the area. 3. The criteria used to evaluate a Special Use Permit does not support approval of this request. Commissioner JOHNSON seconded the motion. Motion carried 6-0. Chairperson LANGDON called for a brief recess at 8:46 p.m. Meeting reconvened at 8:55 p.m. Commissioner CERVENY returned to the meeting at this time. 3. Case No ZOA-92-2: A proposal to amend Wheat Ridge Code of Laws, Chapter 26. Article IV. Sign Code pertaining to "Political Signs". Mr. Gidley reiterated that this case had been continued from February 18, 1993. He then gave some background on this proposed council bill. Chairperson LANGDON asked if there was a limit to the number allowed. Mr. Gidley stated there is no limit, provided they are located on private property. Commissioner ECKHARDT asked if this council bill apply to bus stop bench advertising? Mr. Gidley stated that courtesy benches are regulated under a different section of the Code of Laws. No one was present to speak on this case, nor had anyone signed up to do so. 4 Planning Commission Minutes April 15, 1993 Page 7 Commissioner ECKHARDT moved that Case No. ZOA-92-2, a proposal to amend Wheat Ridge Code of Laws, Chapter 26. Article IV. Sign Code pertaining to "Political Signs", be accepted as presented and forwarded on to City Council with a recommendation for Approval. Commissioner JOHNSON seconded the motion. Motion carried 6-1, Commissioner QUALTERI voting against. $• CLOSE THE PUBLIC HEARING 9. OLD BUSINESS 1• Glen reminded those present that the CML Conference will be held in June. 2. He added that the APA Colorado Conference is scheduled in September. Discussion followed regarding budget available and Commission interest. 10. NEW BUSINESS 11. DISCUSSION AND DECISION ITEMS 12. COMMITTEE & DEPARTMENT REPORTS 13. ADJOURNMENT There being no further business, Commissioner RASPLICKA moved for adjournment. Commissioner ECKHARDT seconded the motion. Motion carried 7-0, and meeting adjourned at 9:10 p.m. `~~~ 'G Sandra Wiggins, ecretary Planning Commission Minutes April 15, 1993 Page 6 many of the neighborhood concerns are not warranted. He noted that the tracks can be fun and educational. Irene Galves stated when making comparisons of loud music, jackhammers, lawnmowers and chainsaws to the sound produced by the proposed ten to 12 go-karts, the main difference is that lawnmowers, chainsaws or loud music can be turned off. Commissioner QUALTERI moved that Case No. SUP-93-2, an application by JoAnn and Orlando Martinez for approval of a Special Use Permit to allow a go-kart track with concession on C-1 zoned property at 4075 Kipling Street be Denied for the following reasons: 1. The site plan does not provide adequate buffering and does not function properly in regard to access and parking. 2. The proposed use is incompatible with adjacent development and potential land use in the area. 3. The criteria used to evaluate a Special Use Permit does not support approval of this request. Commissioner JOHNSON seconded the motion. Motion carried 6-0. Chairperson LANGDON called for a brief recess at 8:46 p.m. Meeting reconvened at 8:55 p.m. Commissioner CERVENY returned to the meeting at this time. 3. Case No ZOA-92-2: A proposal to amend Wheat Ridge Code of Laws, Chapter 26. Article IV. Sign Code pertaining to "Political Signs". Mr. Gidley reiterated that this case had been continued from February 18, 1993. He then gave some background on this proposed council bill. Chairperson LANGDON asked if there was a limit to the number allowed. Mr. Gidley stated there is no limit, provided they are located on private property. Commissioner ECKHARDT asked if this council bill apply to bus stop bench advertising? Mr. Gidley stated that courtesy benches are regulated under a different section of the Code of Laws. No one was present to speak on this case, nor had anyone signed up to do so. Planning Commission Minutes April 15, 1993 Page 7 Commissioner ECKHARDT moved that Case No. ZOA-92-2, a proposal to amend Wheat Ridge Code of Laws, Chapter 26. Article IV. Sign Code pertaining to "Political Signs", be accepted as presented and forwarded on to City Council with a recommendation for Approval. Commissioner JOHNSON seconded the motion. Motion carried 6-1, Commissioner QUALTERI voting against. 8. CLOSE THE PUBLIC HEARING 9. OLD BUSINESS 1. Glen reminded those present that the CML Conference-will be held in June. 2. He added that the APA Colorado Conference is scheduled in September. Discussion followed regarding budget available and Commission interest. 10. NEW BUSINESS 11. DISCUSSION AND DECISION ITEMS 12. COMMITTEE & DEPARTMENT REPORTS 13. ADJOURNMENT There being no further business, Commissioner RASPLICKA moved for adjournment. Commissioner ECKHARDT seconded the motion. Motion carried 7-0, and meeting adjourned at 9:10 p.m. Sandra Wiggins, ecretary AGENDA ITEI~f RECAP _ PUBLIC HEARINGS _ PROC./CEREMONIES BIDS/MOTIONS _ INFORNATION ONLY QUASI-JUDICIAL Yes __ CITYADH.,HATTERS CZTY ATTY. MATTERS LIQUOR HEARINGS _ PUBLIC COMMENT -~_ No ELEC. OFFICIALS MATTERS X ORDINANCES FOR 1ST READING _ ORDINANCES FOR 2ND REAPING RESOLUTIONS AGENDA ITED[ TITLE:.A Council Bill for lst Reading amending..th~ Si n-Code._-~ relating to. Temporary Sigx~s an~re"particularly Political Signsg SUMMARY/RECOMMENDATION: The attached Council Bill incorporates those revisions suggested by Council at their study session held March 21, 1994. Planning held a public hearing on this matter April 15, 1993 and recommended approval. Staff recommends approvals ATTACHMENTS: BUDGETED 1) Council Bill No. ITEM: Yes No 2) Planning Commission minutes & resolution 3) Original proposal that Planning Dept/Acct # Commission recommended to CC Budgeted Amount $ Requested Expend.$ Requires Transfer/ Supp. Appropriation Yes No SUGGESTED MOTION: I move that Council Bill No. be approved on 1st Reading, published in full and a public hearing be scheduled on May 9, 1994. If approved on 2nd Reading, the ordinance shall become effective 15 days after final publication. ~ ~ ~ M E M O RAND U M TO: Kathryn Schroeder, City Attorney FROM: Glen Gidley, Director of Planning & Development RE: Proposed Amendment to Sign Code DATE: July 19, 1993 The attached proposed Council Bill has already gone through Planning Commission at a public hearing held April 15. They have recommended approval. John Hayes had reviewed it and gave it his blessing, however, it got .lost in the shuffle between the changing-of-the-guard (attorneys). Please review and comment so that I can place it on the August 9 agenda for first reading. GEG:slw attachment ~`~'~~/d~M`9 l i / ` ~~ ~~-- . w~ ~.~~ ~ a~~~~. ~-- ,.~; , M E M O R AND U M TO: .` Manning Commission ~` ~/ FROM:;! Glen Gidley, Director of Planning and Development RE: Case No. ZOA-92-2 DATE: April 8, 1993 This case was originally scheduled for public hearing on February 18, 1993. The hearing was continued to April 15, 1993 so that Staff and our City Attorney could consider revised language. The attached proposed Council Bill includes those revisions. I have attached my original memo to you, dated February 5, for reference. GEG:slw attachments Z~rd 1~~F APPRov,~r !~ y PG INTRODUCED BY COUNCILMEMBER Council Bill No. _ Ordinance No. Series of 1993 TITLE: AN ORDINANCE AMENDING THE SIGN CODE OF THE CODE OF LAWS OF THE CITY OF WHEAT RIDGE RELATING TO POLITICAL SIGNS. BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF WHEAT RIDGE, COLORADO, AS FOLLOWS: Sect on 1 Wheat Ridge Code of Laws, Chapter 26. Article IV. Sign Code, Section 26-403 Definitions is hereby amended by the addition of a new definition for the term POLITICAL SIGN to read as follows: "Political ig~ & noncommercial temporary sign, which is exempt from permit requirements, erected or placed so as to advertise, announce, declare, or state a political message, whether relating to a political campaign or election or any other issue of public concern which is protected by the First Amendment's right of free speech." Section 2 Wheat Ridge Code of Laws, Chapter 26. Article IV. Sign Code, Section 26-410 Permitted Signs' Specifications and regulations, subsection (n) Temporary, is hereby amended as follows: "(n) Temporary. (1) Except for Political signs, one per street frontage, and set back at least ten (10) feet from street right-of-way line. (2) Construction sign not to exceed thirty-two (32) square feet and twelve (12) feet in height. Allowed between time a building permit is issued and a Certificate of Occupancy is obtained. (3) Political campaign signs may be located on private property only by permission of the landowner and if located in commercial and industrial districts are not to exceed sixteen (16) square feet; or if located in any other zone district, shall not exceed eight (8) square feet. All such signs shall be removed within seven (7} days after election. (4) For sale or lease signs not to be illuminated and no larger than nine (9) square feet for one and two-family dwelling residential uses and no larger than fifty (50) square feet for all other uses. (5) Banners, pennants, streamers and/or inflatable. advertising devices are allowed for any.non- -residentially used property to advertise special r~vents or sales, provided that such devices are securely anchored so as to prevent blowing, flapping, dislocation, entanglement or undue distraction or .hazard Ordinance No. _ Page 2 Series of 1993 to motorists, or encroachment upon adjacent property or public streets." (6) Temporary signs are prohibited upon public rights-of- way. Where it is difficult to determine the public right-of-way boundary due to lack of curb, gutter and/or sidewalk, or survey markers, such boundaries shall be presumed to be ten (10) feet from the edge of pavement or back of curb. Where a sidewalk exists, such boundaries shall be presumed to be two (2) feet from outside edge of sidewalk. Temporary signs found by an enforcement officer to be located within City right-of- way shall be removed by such enforcement officer with no requirement of notice." Section 3 Safety Clause The City Council hereby finds, determines, and declares that this ordinance i.s promulgated under the general police power of the City of Wheat Ridge, that it is promulgated for the health, safety, and welfare of the public, and that this ordinance is necessary for the preservation of health and safety and for the protection of public convenience and welfare. The City Council further determines that the ordinance bears a rational relation to the proper legislative object sought to be attained. Section ~ Severab{lity If any clause, sentence, paragraph, or part of this ordinance or the application thereof to any person or circumstances shall for any reason be adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction invalid, such judgment shall not affect, impair or invalidate the remainder of this ordinance or its application to other persons or circumstances. Section Suoerses~t~.+ r'~ause If any provision, requirement or standard established by this Ordinance is found to conflict with similar provisions, requirements or standards found elsewhere in the Code of Laws of the City of Wheat Ridge, which are in existence as of the date of adoption of this Ordinance, the provisions, requirements and standards herein shall supersede and prevail. Section 6 This ordinance shall take effect days after final publication. -- INTRODUCED, READ, AND ADOPTED on first reading by a vote of to on this day of 1993, ordered published in full in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Wheat Ridge and Public Hearing and consideration on final passage set for _1993, at 7:30 o'clock p.m., in the Council Chambers, 7500 West 29th Avenue, Wheat Ridge, Colorado. Ordinance No. Series of 1993 .Page 3 READ, ADOPTED AND ORDERED PUBLISHED on second and final reading by a vote of to this day of , 1993. -- SIGNED by the Mayor on this day of 1993 ATTEST: Wanda Sang, City Clerk 1st Publication: 2nd Publication: Wheat Ridge Sentinel Effective Date: <pc>ordsigncode . _ ._ r.. RAY J. WINGER, MAYOR APPROVED AS TO FORM BY CITY ATTORNEY JOHN HAYES, CITY ATTORNEY M E M O RAND U M TO: lanning Commission FROM: Glen Gidley, Director of Planning & Development RE: Case No. ZOA-92-2 Proposed Amendment to Sign Code, Article IV. pertaining to "Political Signs" DATE: February 5, 1993 The attached Council Bill is a proposal to amend Wheat Ridge Code of Laws,- Section 26-403 and 410 relating to "political signs". This proposal has been initiated by staff (City Administrator and City Attorney) subsequent to issues that arose during discussions surrounding the West 38th Avenue reconstruction project. There was conflict and confusion over the interpretation of the existing provisions when applied to several political signs placed within city street right-of-way. Hence, we have proposed to add a new definition of "Political Sign" since it was not previously defined. (Section 1. of Council Bill) Then, we added specific provisions for political signs (Section 2.) under subsection (5). John Hayes, City Attorney, has reviewed this proposal and his recommended revisions are included in this Council Bill. SUGGESTED MOmTON I move that Case No. ZOA-92-2 be accepted as submitted and forwarded on to City Council with a recommendation for Approval. GEG:slw attachment ~ 57 RAF i ~~~7- w~cr 7o Pc INTRODUCED BY COUNCILMEMBER _ Council Bill No. _ Ordinance No. Series 1992 TITLE: AN ORDINANCE AMENDING THE SIGN CODE OF THE CODE OF LAWS OF THE CITY OF WHEAT RIDGE RELATING TO POLITICAL SIGNS. BE IT ORDAINRD BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF WHEAT RIDGE, COLORADO, AS FOLLOWS: SQCtion 1 Wheat Ridge Code of Laws, Chapter 26. Article IV. Sign Code, Section 26-403 Definitions is hereby amended by the addition of a new definition for the term POLITICAL SIGN to read as follows: 'political Sign. A noncommercial temporary sign, which is exempt from permit requirements, erected or placed so as to advertise, announce, declare, or state a political message, whether relating to a specific political campaign or election or any other protected first amendment right of free speech." Section 2 Wheat Ridge Code of Laws, Chapter 26. Article IV. Sign Code, Section 26-410 Permitted Signs; Specifications and regulations, subsection (n) Temporary, is hereby amended as follows: "(n) Temporary. (1) Except for Political signs, one per street frontage, and setback at least ten (10) feet from street right-of-way line. (2) Construction sign not to exceed thirty-two square feet and twelve (12) feet in height. Allowed between time a building permit is issued and a Certificate of Occupancy is obtained. - --- ---_...... .. .u aid-ir3e~sa~-.-' - . er-gei3e ~Y°~~xi'$~~ 3'iB~ exc= ~ 2 _y ~_ -~'~r~~-8~-eq}xere fee- X11 "-72Q~.~. .Tf2B~ ~ I'~ .~.YL ~.. -.ia- _____ - _. cc czvir.- (~3)For sale or lease signs not to be illuminated and no larger than nine square feet for one and two family dwelling residential. uses and no larger than fifty square feet for all other uses. (§4)Banners, pennants, streamers and/or inflatable advertising devices are allowed for any non-residentially used property to advertise special events or sales, provided that such devices are securely anchored so as to prevent blowing, flapping, dislocation, entanglement or undue distraction or hazard to motorists, or encroachment upon adjacent property or public streets." Ordinance No. Page 2 (5) Political Signs: a. Location: Must be located on private property only, with permission of the land owner. Such signs are prohibited upon public street rights-of-way. Where it is difficult to determine the public right-of-way boundary due to lack of curb, gutter and/or sidewalk, or survey markers, such boundary shall be assumed to be ten (10) feet from edge of pavement or back of curb. Where a sidewalk exists, such boundary shall be assumed to be two (2) feet from outside edge of, sidewalk. b. Maximum size & height: Residential & Agricultural Zone Districts - eight (8) square feet and forty-two (42) inches high. All other Zone Districts - sixteen (16) square feet and ten (10) feet high. c. Duration allowed: Political signs shall be allowed twenty-one (21) days prior to an election or vote upon a ballot issue and must be removed within seven (7) days of the election or voting date. Political signs not directly related to a scheduled election or vote may be displayed for no longer than thirty (30) consecutive days within any twelve (12) month period. d. Political signs found by an enforcement officer to be located within City right-of-way shall be removed by such enforcement officer with no requirement of notice." Section 3 Safety C1_a~,G~_ The City Council hereby finds, determines, and declares that this ordinance is promulgated under the general police power of the City of Wheat Ridge, that it is -- promulgated for the health, safety, and welfare of the public, and that this ordinance is necessary for the preservation of health and safety and for the protection of public convenience and welfare. The City Council further determines that the ordinance bears a rational relation to the proper legislative object sought to be attained. Section 4. Severability If any clause, sentence, paragraph, or part of this ordinance or the application thereof to any person or circumstances shall for any reason be adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction invalid, such judgment shall not affect, impair or invalidate the remainder of this ordinance or its application to other persons or circumstances. Section 5 supersession Clause If any provision, requirement or standard established by this Ordinance is found to conflict with Ordinance No. Page 3 similar provisions, requirements or standards found elsewhere in the Code of Laws of the City of Wheat Ridge, Which are in existence as of the date of adoption of this Ordinance, the provisions, requirements and standards herein shall supersede and prevail.- Section 6. This ordinance shall take effect days after final publication. INTRODUCED, READ, AND ADOPTED on first reading by a vote o£ to on this day o.f 1992, ordered published in full in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Wheat Ridge and Public Hearing and consideration on final passage set for 1992, at 7:30 o'clock p.m „ in the Council Chambers, 7500 West 29th Avenue, Wheat Ridge, Colorado. READ, ADOPTED AND ORDERED PUBLISHED on second and final reading by a vote of to this day of , 1992. SIGNED by the Mayor on this day of ATTEST: 1992._ _ RAY J. WINGER, MAYOR Wanda Sang, City Clerk 1st Publication: 2nd Publication: Wheat Ridge Sentinel Effective Date: APPROVED AS TO FORM BY CITY ATTORNEY JOHN HAYES, CITY ATTORNEY d .sigh ~oate,~ CITY COUNCIL MINUTES: May 23, 199'+ Page -6- hlr. Edwards made a point of order that it takes 5 votes to reconsider. At this point he moved to reconsider his motion on 38th Avenue, which takes 5 votes to reconsider; seconded by Mrs. Worth. At this point Mayor Wilde called out to Tony Solano, who had been hooked by via telephone, to see if he could hear and understand the proceedings. Mr. Solano replied that he could hear everything. Ms. Schroeder recommended that a vote on this motion, although made in a timely manner, be deferred until a majority of the entire Council can be present to vote on this because thatrs what the Council Rules state. Mayor Wilde did not agree with Ms. majority. Ms. Schroeder stated th mean. Mr. Edwards made a point of in the Charter that state either a of the Quorum present. You need 5 Ms. Schroeder does not agree. Schroeder. 5 Couneilmembers are a at is not what it was intended to order--there are different sections majority of the Council or a majority votes to reconsider. Mr. Edwards called for the question; carried 4-2 with Mr. Hall and hir. Eafanti voting no. Mr. Solano explained that he had not heard the question correctly over the telephone and requested that Council be polled again. Call for the question was tied 3-3 with Ceuncilmembers Edwards, Fields, and Worth voting yes. Mayor Wilde broke the tie by voting no. Motion failed 4-3. Motion by h;r. Hall to table this Item; seconded by Mr. Eafanti; carried +T-2-with Mrs. Fields and hirs. Worth voting no. Mr. Gidley stated that the applicants fcr Case tJo. Wz-y4-3 have formally requested a continuance to June 13, so that they may address several issues brought up at staff report. Motion by hir. Hall that this matter be rescheduled tc June 13, 199'+; seconded by Mr. Eafanti; carried 6-0. Item 3. - An Ordinance a3opting by reference a replacement pursuant to Wheat Ridge Cade of Laws, Section 26-3(D). Council Bill 56 was introduced by Mrs. Worth on second reading; title read by the Clerk; Ordinance No. 966 assigned. Motion by hirs. Worth for the adoption of Council Bill 56 (Ordinance 9~seconded by Mr. Edwards; carried 6-0. Item 4. ~~.F- An Ordinance amending the of the Code of Laws of the City of Wheat Ridge relating to political signs. Council Bill 57 was introduced by Mr. Eafanti on second reading; title read by the Clerk; Ordinance No. 967 assigned. E CITY COUNCIL MINUTES: May 23, 1994 Page -7- Motion by Mr. Eafanti for the adoption of Council Bill 57 (Ordinance 9~7;^seconded by Mrs. Worth; carried 6-0. Item 5. Application by General Management Company for approval of an amendment to the Planned Commercial Development final development plan for the Applewood Village Shopping Center, located at approximately 3600 Youngfield Street. (Case P7o. WZ-94-4) (To be continued to June 13, 1994) Motion by Mr. Hall to continue this item to June 13, 1994; seconded by Mr. Eafanti. Mrs. Worth clarified that the owner requested the continuance and staff recommends it. Motion carried 5-1 with htr. Solano voting no. ORDINANCES ON FIRST READING Item 6. Council Bill 59 - An Ordinance amending the City-adopted Model Traffic Code of the City of Wheat Ridge, Colorado, to modify the basic rule regarding speed limits within the City. Council Bill 59 was introduced by Mr. Edwards on first reading; title read by the Clerk. Motion by Mr: Edwards that Council Bill 59 be approved on first reading, ordered published, public hearing be set for Monday, June 27, 1994 at 7:00 p.m.. in City Council Chambers, Municipal Bldg., and if approved on second reading, take effect 1 day after final publication; seconded by h1rs. Worth; carried 6-0. DECISIONS, RESOLUTIONS, AND MOTIONS Item 7. Resolution 1402 - stating official position of the City of Wheat Ridge pertaining to replacement of curb ramps in accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Aot. Resolution 1402 was introduced by Mrs. Worth; title read by the Clerk. Mrs. Worth stated that this is such an important Resolution aria she asked the Clerk to read, the entire Resolution into the record. Motion by Mrs. Worth to approve Resolution 1402; seconded by Mr. Eafanti; carried 6-0. item 8. Resolution 1403 - expressing the City of Wheat Ridge official position regarding improvements proposed to the I-76/Wadsworth interchange, Project PJo. I(CX)076-1(151). Resolution 1403 was introduced by Mrs. Worth; title read by the Clerk. Motion by Mrs. Worth to approve Resolution 1403; seconded by Mr. Eafanti; carried 6-0. Mr. Eafanti requested that some sort of sign be placed there to show that this is the City of Wheat Ridge. Mrs. Worth thanked staff for catching this. M 'n ~ INTRODUCED BY COUNCILMEMBER EAFANTI Council Bill No. ~L Ordinance No. 967 Series of 1994. TITLE: AN ORDINANCE AMENDING THE SIGN CODE OF THE CODE OF LAWS OF THE CITY OF WHEAT RIDGE RELATING TO POLITICAL SIGNS. BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF WHEAT RIDGE, COLORADO, AS FOLLOWS: Section 1. Wheat Ridge Code of Laws, Chapter 26. Article IV. Sign Code, Section 26-403 Definitions is hereby amended by the addition of a new definition for the term POLITICAL SIGN-to read as follows: "POLITICAL SIGN. A NONCOMMERCIAL SIGN, WHICH IS EXEMPT FROM PERMIT REQUIREMENTS, ERECTED OR PLACED SO AS TO ADVERTISE, ANNOUNCE, DECLARE, OR STATE A POLITICAL MESSAGE, WHETHER RELATING TO A POLITICAL CAMPAIGN OR ELECTION OR ANY OTHER ISSUE OF PUBLIC CONCERN WHICH IS PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH." Section 2. Wheat Ridge Code of Laws, Chapter 26. Article IV. Sign Code, Section 26-410 Permitted Signs' Specifications and regulations, subsection (n) Temporary, is hereby amended as follows: "(n) Temporary. (1) TEMPORARY SIGNS ARE PROHIBITED UPON PUBLIC RIGHTS-OF- WAY AND MUST COMPLY WITH SIGHT DISTANCE TRIANGLE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 26-30(I)(2). WHERE IT IS DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE THE PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY BOUNDARY DUE TO LACK OF CURB, GUTTER AND/OR SIDEWALK, OR SURVEY MARKERS, SUCH BOUNDARIES SHALL BE PRESUMED TO BE TEN (10) FEET FROM THE EDGE OF PAVEMENT OR BACK OF CURB. .WHERE A SIDEWALK EXISTS, SUCH BOUNDARIES SHALL BE PRESUMED TO BE TWO (2) FEET FROM OUTSIDE EDGE OF SIDEWALK. TEMPORARY SIGNS FOUND BY AN ENFORCEMENT OFFICER TO BE LOCATED WITHIN CITY RIGHT-OF-WAY, OR IN VIOLATION OF SIGHT TRIANGLE REQUIREMENTS, SHALL BE REMOVED BY SUCH ENFORCEMENT OFFICER WITH NO REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE." (2) Construction signs SHALL not to exceed thirty-two (32) square feet and twelve (12) feet in height. One per street frontage allowed between time a building permit is issued and a Certificate of Occupancy is obtained. (3) Political e-emga-#g~c signs may be located on PRIVATE property only by permission of the landowner and if located in commercial and industrial districts are not to exceed sixteen (16) square feet; or if located in any other-zone district, shall not exceed eight (8p square feet. • ~ i ~ Ordinance No. 967 Series of 1994 Page 2 (4) For sale or lease signs SHALL not be illuminated and SHALL. BE no larger than nine (9) square feet for one and two-family dwelling residential uses and no larger than fifty (50) square feet for all other uses. ONE PER STREET FRONTAGE ALLOWED. (5) Banners are permitted for any nonresidentially-zoned or used property to advertise special events or sales subject to the following provisions: a. May be placed upon a building wall or roof, or a fence but shall not be attached to landscaping, freestanding posts, or utility poles. b. The total size allowed for any single banner or total combination of multiple banners shall be determined using the same criteria that applies to Wall Signs. I£ the banner is to be affixed to a fence, size shall be the same as if it was attached to the nearest adjacent building wall having street frontage. c. Any banner that becomes discolored, ragged, shredded, detached, etc. shall be removed or repaired. (6) Pennants, streamers, and similar devices, and balloons or other inflatable devices shall be permitted upon nonresidentially-zoned or used properties-only, subject to the following provisions: a. Any one, or a concurrent or successive combination of pennants, streamers, or balloons or other inflatable devices shall be permitted to advertise special events or sales one (1) time per year for up to thirty (30) days, or two (2) times per year for up to fifteen (15) days each time. b. Such devices shall be securely anchored or attached so as to prevent dislocation, entanglement or encroachment onto adjacent properties or public streets, or-undue hazard to motorists or pedestrians. c. Roof mounting is permitted. d. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection 26- _ -- 407(13), signs regulated pursuant to this subsection 26-410(n)(6) shall be required to obtain a Temporary Sign Permit. (7) It is not the intent of these regulations to prohibit or unreasonably regulate or to require permits for the legitimate display of traditional winter holiday season decorations provided however, that 'such display occurs between November 15 (year-end) and January 15 (new- year), and provided that such decorations or display is installed and maintained in a safe manner. Section 3. Safety Clause The City Council hereby finds, determines, and declares that this ordinance is promulgated under the general police power of the City of Wheat Ridge, that it is promulgated for the health, safety, and welfare of the public, Ordinance No. 967 Series of 1994 Page 3 and that this ordinance is necessary for the preservation of health and safety and for the protection of public convenience and welfare. The City Council further determines that the ordinance bears a rational relation to the proper legislative object sought to be attained. Section 4. Severabilit~ If any clause, sentence, paragraph, or part of this ordinance or the application thereof to any person or circumstances shall for any reason be adjudged by a court o£ competent jurisdiction invalid, such judgment shall not affect,. impair or invalidate the remainder of this ordinance or its application to other persons or circumstances. Section 5. Supersession Clause. If any provision, requirement or standard established by this Ordinance is found to conflict with similar provisions, requirements or standards Found elsewhere in the Code of Laws of the City of wheat Ridge, which are in existence as of the date of adoption of this Ordinance, the provisions, requirements and standards herein shall supersede and prevail. Section 6. ..This ordinance shall take effect 15 days after final publication. INTRODUCED, READ, AND ADOPTED on first reading by a vote of 7 to 0 on this 25th day of April 1994, ordered published in full in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Wheat Ridge and Public Hearing and consideration on final passage set for May 23, 1994, at 7.30 o'clock p.m., in _ the Council Chambers,-7500 West-29th Avenue, Wheat Ridge, Colorado. READ, ADOPTED AND ORDERED PUBLISHED on second and Final reading by a vote of 6 _to 0 this 23rd day of May , 1994. - -- SIGNED by the Mayor on this 24th day of May 1994. Dan Wilde, MAYOR _ ATTEST: ~~ ~..~ Wanda Sang, CITY CLERK ~ J '~ AP~OV~O FORM ATTORNEY Kathry~fi Schroe er, CITY,ATTORNEY 1st Publication: May 3> 1994 2nd Publication: May 31, 1994 Wheat Ridge Sentinel Effective Date: June 15, 1994 <pc>ordsigncode